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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC., : 
.MP 11 o 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
vs. : Case No. 880090 
GAVILAN OPERATING INCORPORATED, : Category No. 14b 
PAUITE OIL & MINING CORP., 
et al. : 
Defendants/Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to §78-2-2(3)(i) as this is an appeal from a final order of 
the Seventh Judicial District Court for Duchesne County 
concerning title to real property. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Does ownership of a debtor's right of redemption 
pass to the debtor's bankruptcy estate upon filing of a 
petition for relief if the property in question was under 
foreclosure at the time of filing but had not been sold? 
A. If the bankruptcy trustee abandons the 
"bankrupt's interest" in real property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 
554, does the trustee also automatically abandon the rights of 
redemption to that property? 
B* Is a right of redemption to real property a 
right personal to the debtor or a right attached to real 
property subject to redemption? 
C* Is a redemption right an asset that arises 
after a foreclosure that constitutes an after acquired asset 
of the bankrupt's estate, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(7)? 
II. Is a right of redemption to real property an 
asset subject to execution under Utah law? 
III. In order to redeem real property under Rule 69, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, must a redemptor strictly 
comply or substantially comply with the procedural 
requirements of Rule 69, U.R.C.P., and was the Court's Ruling 
of substantial compliance justified under the facts of this 
case? 
IV. In order to properly redeem under Rule 69(f)(3) 
must the redemptor post the amount of the sale bid price or 
the amount of the underlying lien in order to extinguish the 
underlying debt? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
See Statutory Appendix. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. is a 
corporation in the business of providing oil well services to 
wells in the eastern Utah area. (R.l) 
2. Paiute Oil and Walker Energy (not parties to this 
appeal) were the owner of mineral interests in the following 
described real property: (R.l) 
Section 13, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, 820 
FNL 932 FEL, Duchesne County, known as 
Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1. 
3. On August 16, 1984, Tech-Fluid provided services, 
equipment and labor to the Paiute well pursuant to contract 
between Tech-Fluid and Paiute Oil. 
4. Tech-Fluid provided material and labor worth 
$69,708.30. Paiute did not pay for any of the materials, 
labor or services rendered to it by Tech-Fluid. (R.2) 
5. Tech-Fluid filed an Amended Notice of Lien with 
the Duchesne County Recorder's Office on November 30, 1984. 
(R.2) 
6. On January 24, 1984, Tech-Fluid filed a complaint 
to foreclose its lien. Paiute Oil, Sam Oil, Inc., Walker 
Energy, Duchesne County, and Gulf Oil Corp. were named as 
defendants.(R.l-6) 
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7. On December 18f 1985," Paiute Oil & Mining 
Corporation filed a voluntary reorganization petition under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code with the United- States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. All - actions 
against Paiute were stayed by the filing of that Petition. 
8. On February 25, 1986, the District Court ordered 
that the answers of defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy, 
Chevron USA, Inc. and Duchesne County be stricken and granted 
judgment of foreclosure of Tech-Fluid. (R.423-424). A copy of 
the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
9. Tech-Fluid obtained an order granting relief from 
the automatic stay on May 18, 1987 as to Paiute Oil. (R.427) 
A copy of the Court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "B."1 
10. On May 20, 1987, T^ch-Fluid obtained an order 
authorizing foreclosure and a public sale pursuant to the 
provisions of the Mechanic Lien Foreclosure Act. (R.426) 
11. Tech-Fluid subsequently filed a notice of 
sheriff's sale and an execution in the amount of $86,943.64 
together with interest. (R.435) The property was sold July 
2, 1987 to Tech-Fluid for $4000. (R.443-444) 
12. On December 31, 1987, Paiute Oil, through a 
director Walter Davidson, purportedly assigned Paiute Oil's 
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redemption rights to Wind River Resources Corporation. 
(R.462) A copy of the assignment is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C." 
13. The assignment has been purportedly acknowledged 
by an unidentified notary without a seal being apparent on the 
face of the copy. Exhibit "C" (R.462) 
14. On January 1, 1^88, Wind River Resources served 
the following Documents on an on duty dispatcher at the 
Duchesne County Sheriff's Office: 
Exhibit wDn - Cashier's check in the sum of $4310.00 
Exhibit "E" - Assignment of Rights of Redemption 
Exhibit "F" - Notice of Redemption 
Exhibit nG" - Sheriff's Redemption Certificate 
15. On January 8, 1988, plaintiff filed a motion for 
order to show cause why the Sheriff should not issue a deed to 
Tech-Fluid based upon an invalid redemption. (R.492-53) 
16. The Court issued an order to show cause to be 
heard on January 19, 1988 at 1:30 in Duchesne County 
Courthouse. (R.454-55) 
17. The Court held a hearing on January 19, 1988 on 
plaintiff's order to show cause. Counsel for Tech-Fluid and 
Wind River argued the case to the Court and were given ten 
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days to submit briefs. (R.456) 
18. The Court issued its Ruling on February 5, 1988 
ruling that the assignment was valid, rights of redemption 
could not be executed upon and Wind River was entitled to 
redemption under Rule 69 because it had substantially complied 
with Rule 69. Finally, the Court ordered that Tech-Fluid had 
no further interest in the well. (R.569-570) 
19. On February 10, 1988 Tech-Fluid filed a motion 
and accompanying memorandum of law pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3) 
objecting to the amount of money posted by Wind River. 
Tech-Fluid requested a hearing on its motion. (R.581-585) 
20. On February 11, 1988 plaintiff filed a Motion to 
Alter or Amend the ruling (R.572-573) raising the issues of 
whether plaintiff's lien is extinguished and whether the Court 
misapplied this Court's holding in J.A. Mollerup v. Storage 
Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). (R.572-80) 
21. Wind River filed responses to plaintiff's motion 
and filed a motion for sanctions. (R.586-599) 
22. Plaintiff responded to Wind River's motion for 
sanctions (R.600-602) and replied to Wind River's responses to 
plaintiff's other motions. (R.603-608) Plaintiff filed a 
request for ruling on all motions before the Court. (R.609-610) 
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23. On February 29, 1988 the Court issued its ruling 
denying all post hearing motions. (R.611) 
24. The Court signed its Conclusions of Law and Order 
on February 29, 1988. (R.612-617) 
25. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on March 3, 
1988. (R.619-620) 
26. Subsequent to filing plaintiff's Notice of 
Appeal, defendant Wind River Resources sold its-interest to 
Gavilan Operating Incorporated. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in ruling that the rights of 
redemption to the oil well 13-ND-l belonged to Paiute Oil on 
December 31, 1987. Paiute had been in bankruptcy since 
September 1984 and the redemption rights were an assets of its 
bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 541(a)(1) and (7). 
Redemption rights are interests in property which pass to the 
trustee in bankruptcy. Paiute Oil did not own the rights when 
they sold them to Wind River on December 31, 1987 and the 
trustee as owner of the rights never sold or abandoned the 
rights. As such Wind River Resource's redemption is invalid. 
Wind River's redemption is also void for failure to 
comply with the mandatory requirements Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure Rule 69 governing redemptions. Specifically, Wind 
River failed to file a certified copy of the order*granting 
foreclosure and execution; failed to provide a properly 
acknowledged assignment of rights; and failed to file an 
affidavit showing the amount due on the lien. The 
deficiencies render the redemption void for failure to adhere 
to the minimal procedural requirements of Rule 69(f), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 
The trial court erred when it held that Wind River 
substantially complied with the provisions of Rule 69. 
"Substantial compliance" is not a basis for the court granting 
relief to Wind River absent some reason for the court to 
proceed in equity. This Court's decision in J.A. Mollerup v. 
Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), 
mandates strict compliance with Rule 69. This Court's 
decision in United States v. Loosley, 551 P.d 506 (Utah 1976) 
is inapplicable to the facts of this case because Tech-Fluid 
engaged in no inequitable conduct justifying equitable 
relief. Because Wind River failed to comply with Rule 69, the 
redemption is void. 
Wind River also failed to post the proper amount of 
money for redemption. In order to redeem. Wind River must 
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post the entire amount due- on the lien with interest. Rule 
69(f)(3) provides for payment of the entire lien in order to 
redeem under a lien foreclosure. In the alternative, if Wind 
River need only post the amount of the sale, then 
Tech-Fluidfs lien is still in tact and Tech-Fluid may once 
again foreclose its lien. Redemption only stopped the sale 
and restored the debtor to its property as if there had been 
no sale. The property is therefore encumbered by the lien. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION IS A SEPARATE ASSET OF THE 
BANKRUPTCY ESTATE THAT HAD NOT BEEN ABANDONED OR SOLD BY THE 
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE AND THEREFORE DID NOT BELONG TO PAIUTE OIL 
ON DECEMBER 31, 1987. 
Paiute Oil filed for Bankruptcy on December 18, 1985, 
and the case is still pending. Paiute Oil was therefore still 
under the protection of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
throughout the entire redemption period of July 21, 1987 to 
January 2, 1988. On December 31, 1987, Paiute assigned its 
redemption rights to Wind River Resources without the 
knowledge or consent of the Bankruptcy Trustee or the 
Bankruptcy Court and without notice and opportunity to bid on 
the rights by any creditor. The first issue presented is 
-9-
whether Paiute Oil or the Bankruptcy estate owned the rights 
of redemption. 
Tech-Fluid had filed its lien foreclosure action 
against the Paiute oil Well 13-1 prior to Paiute's filing 
bankruptcy. When Paiute filed for Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C. 362 
stayed all further action against Paiute by Tech-PLuid and all 
other creditors. The first sub-issue is whether the 
redemption rights became property of the estate at the time of 
filing. 
The relevant part of 11 O.S.C. 5541(a) provides: 
(a) The commencement of a case under Section 
301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an 
estate. Such estate is comprised of all 
the following property wherever located 
and by whomever held: 
(1) . . . all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property 
as of the commencement of the case 
. . . 
(7) Any interest in property that the 
estate acquires after the 
commencement of the case. 
The broad language of 5541(a)(1) encompasses all legal 
and equitable interests owned by the debtor at the time of 
filing the petition. Numerous courts have held that a 
mortgagor's redemption rights is an asset of the estate over 
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which the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction. See In re Smith, 
43 B.R. 313, 11 C.B.C.2d 1057 (BC ND 111. 1984); Ravenswood v. 
Patzhold# 27 B.R. 542 (BC ND 111. 1982); In Re Markee, 31 B.R. 
429, 8 C.B.C.2d 1331 (BC DC Idaho 1983). Indeed, most courts 
which have looked at the issues of who may sell the redemption 
rights, including the Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah, have specifically held that the debtors equity of 
redemption with its rights to exercise, sell or transfer these 
rights pass to and can only be exercised by the trustee in 
Bankruptcy. See In re Patio Springs, Inc., 6 B.R.W. 428, 431 
(B.C.D. Utah 1980) (construing Utah law); In re Thomas J. 
Grosso Investment, Inc. 457 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(construing Arizona law); In re Bank of the Commonwealth, 6 
C.B.C. 699 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (construing Michigan law). 
The Patio Springs the Bankruptcy Court stated as a 
matter of law that the debtor's right of redemption passes to 
the bankruptcy trustee when the debtor is in bankruptcy. The 
debtor in Patio Springs filed a petition for relief under 
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act. The debtor owned property 
in Weber County encumbered by a first mortgage by First 
Security Bank. rd. at 6 B.R. 428. Pursuant to the orders of 
the Bankruptcy Court, the stay against First Security Bank was 
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vacated and the bank was allowed to foreclose on October 18f 
1979. On April 27, 1980, one day prior to expiration of the 
six month statutory period of redemption* the Court 
adjudicated the debtor bankrupt and appointed a trustee. The 
trustee subsequently made application to the Court to sell the 
bankrupt's right of redemption. Td. Although the issue was 
whether 11(e) of the Bankruptcy Act extended the redemption 
period for 60 days, the Court quite clearly recognized that 
the debtor's right of redemption belongs to the trustee if the 
debtor is in bankruptcy proceedings. 
As the Court stated: 
It is, first of all, essential to note that the 
equity of redemption, and its concomitant rights 
to exercise or transfer such, are property 
rights of the debtor which the trustee 
succeeds. See Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96 
Utah 297, 85 P.2d 770, 775 (1938) 
Patio Springs at 6 BRW 431. 
Thus, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah 
construing Utah's Redemption Statute has held that the right 
of redemption belonged to the trustee in Bankruptcy. This 
opinion is in accord with the Court's decision in Layton v. 
Layton, 140 P.2d 759 (Utah 1943). 
The Layton Court recognizes that the rights of 
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redemption owned by the debtor pass to the Bankruptcy estate. 
As the Court stated: 
It is evident, therefore, that the only right or 
interest in this property which became subject 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy 
court was the right of redemption. 
Id. at 761. 
In another part of the opinion the Court stated: 
I am also clearly of the view that the 
foreclosure sales and the issuance of the 
sherifffs certificates thereunder operated to 
extinguish all of the mortgagor's property in 
and to the real estate involved, save only the 
bare legal title, coupled with the statutory 
right of possession and the right of redemption 
within the time allowed by statute. These are 
valuable property rights, and the bankruptcy 
court undoubtedly has jurisdiction over them. 
Id. at 763. (Emphasis added) 
In this case, however, a trial Court ruled that the 
trustee abandoned the redemption rights when she abandoned the 
well pursuant to the Bankruptcy Court's order. There are 
three separate reasons why this ruling is erroneous as a 
matter of law. 
A. The asset of the debtor's right of redemption is a 
personal right of the debtor and does not constitute any 
interest in the well itself. 
The right of redemption was created by statute which 
is silent as to the exact nature of the right. The statutory 
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language has remained essentially unchanged since the 10th 
Circuit discussed the nature of the redemption right in Layton 
v. Thayne. 133 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 19.43)f.4a bankruptcy case 
construing Utah's redemption law. Layton involved a case 
where the plaintiff formerly owned a farm in Utah. In 
December 1936 he gave the Davis County Bank a mortgage on his 
farm. Thereafter in the same month he executed a second 
mortgage to the Rural Rehabitation Corp. which transferred the 
mortgage to Thayne. On February 1, 1937, Thayne instituted 
foreclosure proceedings on Layton's second mortgage, subject 
to the first mortgage. On February 15 Layton deeded the farm 
to his wife. The Thayne mortgaae foreclosure proceeded to 
judgment and sale. Layton made no attempt to redeem within 
the statutory period and the sheriff issued and delivered a 
deed to Thayne. I_d. at 288. 
The first mortgagor then instituted a foreclosure 
action which also proceeded to judgment and sale. At the sale 
the bank purchased the property for less than the amount of 
its claim and Layton became a judgment debtor. The bank had 
Layton physically removed from the property by writ two days 
after the sale. 
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Shortly before the expiration of the period of 
redemption under the bankfs foreclosure proceedings, Layton 
filed an amended petition in Bankruptcy and was adjudicated 
bankrupt. Layton then asserted that he had a right of 
possession of his farm during the redemption period pursuant 
to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act governing agricultural 
composition or extension proceedings. The creditors sought to 
strike the farm from his schedule due to the fact that the 
Thayne foreclosure divested Layton of all his interest in the 
property. 
The Court ruled that the right of redemption was a 
personal right under Utah law and not a right in the land 
itself which would have entitled Layton to immediate 
possession of the farm or the fruits thereof. Id. at 
289-290. As the Court stated: 
It is concede that under the laws of Utah 
appellant has a right of redemption. This right 
of redemption is within the protective 
provisions of the act . . . but it does not 
follow that, because a distressed farmer has a 
right of redemption, he is entitled to the 
possession thereof, together with income 
therefrom, in a farmer debtor proceeding. 
In reasoning why the right of redemption does not 
grant Layton a right of possession in the land the Court 
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stated: 
It (statutory right of redemption) is a mere 
personal privilege rather than an interest or 
estate in land. It maybe exercised only by 
those persons named in the statute 
(citation omitted) and only by them after 
foreclosure. It does not constitute any 
interest or estate in the real estate itself. 
Layton v, Thayne, 133 F.2d at 289. (Emphasis added) 
The right of redemption is therefore an asset that 
does not go with the land. As such, it was not abandoned by 
the trustee when she abandoned the well and remained property 
of the estate as does any other personal right of the debtor. 
There are strong policy reasons for holding that a 
right of redemption remains the property of the bankruptcy 
estate even though the underlying property is abandoned by the 
trustee. The purpose behind the bankruptcy stay is to grant 
the debtor breathing space to allow an orderly marshalling of 
the debtors assets for sale and distribution to creditors in 
an orderly and equitable manner. 
The definition contained in 11 O.S.C. §541(a> is as 
broad as possible so as to include all the debtor's legal and 
equitable interests. Courts have held that this definition 
encompasses the following causes of action: personal injury, 
Tignor v, Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977 (CA 4th Cir 1984); business 
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torts, Moore v. Slonimf 426 F.Supp. 524 (DC Com 1977)j 
property damage, In re Winters, 424 F.Supp. 1389 (ED Mo. 
1975); and breach of contract actions - In re J. Robert 
Pierson, Inc. 44 BR 556 (ED Pa 1984). 
In re Taylorf 21 B.R. 179, 180 (B.C. W.D. Mo 1982), 
the Court determined that under Missouri law a right of 
redemption is a cause of action of the debtor to which the 
trustee in bankruptcy succeeds upon filing of a petition. 
These cases clearly indicate that the policy behind 
bankruptcy is to use whatever nonexempt interest in property 
the debtor may own to satisfy the claims, of creditors. Righ*-
of redemption are assets that should be administered by the 
trustee to satisfy the claims of creditors. 
This conclusion is supported by Bankruptcy Rule 6008 
which provides: 
On motion by the debtorf trustee or debtor in 
possession and after hearing an notice as the 
Court may direct, the Court may authorize the 
redemption of property from a lien or from a 
sale to enforce a lien in accordance with 
applicable law. 
Rule 6008 clearly indicates that rights of redemption 
are property of the estate to be exercised only after approval 
of the court with notice to the secured creditor. Thus 
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although the trustee abandoned "the bankrupts interest in the 
well" it did not abandon the right of redemption and the right 
of redemption remained property of the estate. 
B. The redemption rights were not listed,as an asset 
of the debtor and therefore could not be abandoned by the 
trustee pursuant to 11 D,S,C> 554. 
Assets of the Bankruptcy estate may be abandoned only 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 554 because of the code's twin policies 
of mandating court approval for abandonment and administering 
the estate for the benefit of all creditors. See, In re Auto 
West, Inc., 43 B.R. 761 (DC Utah 1984). 11 U.S.C. §554 
provides that after notice and hearing, the trustee may 
abandon property of the estate that is of inconsequential 
value and benefit to the estate. 
The record is clear that the trustee never abandoned 
the redemption rights per se. Gavilon appears to argue that 
the rights went with abandonment of the well. This argument 
avoids the rule of law that all the debtors property remains 
in the estate until the property is administered or 
abandoned. 11 U.S.C. 554(d). The party asserting that 
property of the bankruptcy estate has been abandoned has the 
burden of proving abandonment. Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, 
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Inc. v. Orret, 469 F.Supp 643 (ED Pa 1979). 
In this case the rights of redemption were not listed 
as an abandoned asset and therefore could only be sold by the 
trustee. This fact was implicitly recognized by Paiute Oil 
when it turned over the proceeds from the assignment to the 
trustee in bankruptcy on January 11, 1988. Wind River and its 
successor in interest therefore have failed to establish 
abandonment of the redemption rights to the debtor. 
C. In the alternative/ the rights of redemption 
became an after acquired asset of the bankruptcy estate. 
Section 541(a)(7) was a new addition, to the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code which has no counterpart in the old Bankruptcy 
The Legislative history of Section 541(a)(7) is 
new. The provision clarifies that any interest 
in property that the estate acquires after the 
commencement of the case is property of the 
estate. For example, if the estate enters into 
a contract, after commencement of the case, such 
a contract would be property of the estate. The 
addition of this provision of House amendment 
merely clarifies that 8541(a) is an all 
embracing definition which includes charges on 
property such as liens held by the debtor on 
property of a third party, or the beneficial 
rights and interest that the debtor may have in 
the property of another. . . . 
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In re Savary, 57 B.R. 298 (CH Bankr.L.Rptr• 70969- BC 
MD Pla 1986) is illustrative of Tech-Fluid's claim. Savary 
involved a debtorfs tractor loader which had been repleved 
prepetition and sold post petition in violation of the 
automatic stay. After awarding $10,000 in damages against the 
creditor, the court held an adversary proceeding to determine 
whether the debtor or the trustee was entitled to damages. 
The Court held that since the sale had not taken place at the 
time of filing, legal title remained in the debtor and became 
property of the estate. Accordingly, when it was converted, 
the party injured was the debtorfs estate, not the debtor 
individually, and damages belonged to the estate pursuant to 
541(a)(7). Ijd. at 57 B.R. 298-300. 
In this case the redemption rights existed due to the 
debtorfs legal title in the well which passed to the trustee 
upon filing. In its order, the trustee abandoned "the 
bankrupts interest in the well." The trustee did not abandon 
all of the estatefs interest in the well. Accordingly, when 
the foreclosure sale occurred on July 2, 1987, the redemption 
right inurred to the benefit of the estate and became an after 
acquired asset of the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 
541(a)(7). The bankruptcy estate therefore owned the rights 
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of redemption throughout the period of redemption*. Wind River 
acquired nothing by way of its assignment of redemption rights 
because Paiute Oil never owned the rights. 
POINT II 
IN THE EVENT PAIUTE OIL OWNED THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION, 
TECH-FLUID EXECUTED UPON THE ASSET PRIOR TO ASSIGNMENT. 
Generally, every kind of property or interest therein, 
not otherwise exempt by statute, may be reached by an 
execution issued on a judgment. C.J.S. Executions §18 p.152. 
As noted, rights of redemption are not expressly exempted by 
statute. Furthermore, Utah cases treat rights of redemption 
as property interests in that they are completely 
transferable. See Carlguist v. Coltharp, 348 P. 481 (Utah 
1926); Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940 (Utah 1933); Bennion v. 
Amoss, 530 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975). 
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the nature of 
this asset in several cases. In Mollerup v. Storage Systems 
International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), the lower court had 
extended the period of redemption beyond that established by 
statute. To this, the Supreme Court admonished the lower 
court by stating: 
that no tender was ever made since the 
bankrupt estate was and is entirely without 
assets and that the only prospect of an "asset" 
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is the value, if any, of the right of redemption 
for which he is hopeful of finding a purchaser. 
.Id. at 1124. 
Accordingly, although the statute does not expressly 
term a right of redemption a property interest, Utah cases 
consistently treat it as though it has property 
characteristics in that it has value and is transferable and 
as such should be subject to execution. 
Additional support for permitting execution on rights 
of redemption is found in Evans v. Humphrey, 5 P.2d 545 (Idaho 
1931). In Evans, the Idaho Court acknowledged a split of 
jurisdictions on the subject but nonetheless found that a 
judgment debtor's equitable right of redemption, after 
execution sale was subject to levy and sale under subsequent 
executions. Id. at 547. Idaho's redemption statute is 
similar to that of Utah's redemption statute. This position 
has been affirmed in a recent Idaho case as well. See Suchan 
v. Suchan, 741 P.2d 1289 (Idaho 1986). 
POINT III 
WIND RIVER RESOURCES' REDEMPTION WAS INVALID FOR 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 69(f), U.R.C.P. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 69(f) governs the 
procedural requirements for a valid redemption. Rule 69(f)(2) 
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provides: 
At the time of redemption the person seeking thfc 
same may make payment of the amount required to 
the person from whom the property is being 
redeemed, or for him to the officer who made the 
sale or his successor in office. At the same 
time the redemptioner must produce to the 
officer or person from whom he seeks to redeem, 
and serve with his notice to the officer: 
(Emphasis added) 
• • • 
(1) a certified copy of the docket of the 
judgment under which he claims the right 
to redeem; 
(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged or 
proved where the same is necessary to 
establish his claim; 
(3) an affidavit by himself or his agent 
showing the amount due on the lien. 
When Wind River filed for redemption is served upon a 
dispatcher at the Duchesne County Sherifffs Office the 
following documents: 
1) A copy of an Assignment of Rights (Exhibit E); 
2) A Notice of Redemption (Exhibit F); 
3) Sheriff's Certificate of Redemption (Exhibit G); 
and 
4) A cashier's check in the sum of $4310.00 (Exhibit 
D). 
Wind River filed no other documents. 
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Wind River failed to file a certified copy of the 
order of foreclosure. Moreover, the original Document 
evidencing the assignment does not supply a recognizable 
notary seal or signature. Finally, Wind River failed to file 
an affidavit showing the amount due on the lien. 
The trial Court nonetheless ruled that Wind River 
substantially complied with Rule 69 and authorized redemption. 
The trial court erred in authorizing redemption 
because substantial compliance is not the standard this Court 
stated is the law regarding compliance with Rule 69. In 
Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 
1977), this Court held that a redemptor must strictly comply 
with the requirements of statute. 
In Mollerup, the trial court extended the period of 
redemption beyond the six month period of redemption pursuant 
to two ex parte orders submitted by the redemptor under Rule 
6, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Reversing, the Court held: 
The right of redemption has long been recognized 
as a substantive right to be exercised in strict 
accord with statutory terms. It is not an 
equitable right cured or regulated by principles 
of equity but, rather, is a creature of statute 
and depends entirely upon the provisions of the 
statute creating the right. 
Id. 569 P.2d at 1124 (Emphasis added) 
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Wind River's efforts to redeem clearly do not 
constitute strict compliance with the terms of the statute as 
mandated by this Court's decision in Mollerup. 
The Court found that substantial compliance with Rule 
69 is sufficient to establish a valid redemption. Assuming 
arguendo that the documents filed constitute substantial 
compliance/ the redemption still is invalid under Mollerup 
because they were not in strict compliance with statute. Wind 
River however cited this Courtfs decision in United States v. 
Loosley/ 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976) for support that substantial 
compliance is sufficient to justify redemption. 
Loosley involved the same deficiencies as in this case 
with the exception that in this case Tech-Fluid is also 
challenging the validity of the assignment. The chief 
difference between this case and Loosley's is that the 
creditor-purchaser knew of the deficiencies in Loosley and 
failed to notify the redemptor. The Court sitting in equity 
held that the deficiencies were insufficient to defeat the 
redemption because the creditor- purchaser knew 24 hours prior 
to the expiration of the redemption period of the redemptor*s 
technical deficiencies in the redemption. The creditor failed 
to inform the redemptors even after a phone call by the 
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redemptor asking if there were any deficiencies in the 
redemption* Ij3. at 507. Under the facts of Loosley, the 
Court held that the trial court, sitting in equity, could 
grant the redemption despite the deficiencies due to the 
misconduct and waiver on the part of the creditor-mortgagee* 
IcU at 508. 
The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable 
from Loosley in that Tech-Fluid had no knowledge of the 
redemption until after the period to redeem had expired. This 
Court's decision in Mollerup specifically limits Loosley to 
instances where a court sitting in equity may grant relief for 
"fraud, accident, mistake or waiver as was found to exist in 
United States v. Loosley, Utah, 551 P.2d 506 (1976). * 
Mollerup, 569 P.2d at 1124. There are simply no facts in this 
case to move the conscience of the court to grant Wind River 
relief in equity as there was no fraud, accident, mistake or 
waiver on the part of Tech-Fluid. Mollerup mandates that Wind 
River's redemption be denied for failure to comply with Rule 
69(f). To allow redemption under these facts will render the 
requirements of Rule 69 advisory. 
Moreover, absent inequitable conduct on the part of 
the creditor, substantial compliance is a bad rule and may 
-26-
lead to further litigation over what constitutes substantial 
compliance. This Court has frowned upon substantial 
compliance in recent cases construing the notice requirements 
of Utah's lien statute. In Graff v. Boise Cascade Corp.y 660 
P.2d 721 (Utah 1983), the lien claimant filed a notice of lien 
that failed to contain the name of the person to whom the 
material was furnished and the notice lacked proper 
verification. This Court held the lien invalid refusing to 
apply the doctrine of substantial compliance to the facts of 
that case. Icl. at 722-723. See also, First Security Mortgage 
Co. v, Hansen, 631 P,2d 919 (Utah 1981) (where this Court 
rejected plaintiff's substantial compliance argument and held 
that proper verification of the lien notice was a mandatory 
condition precedent to creation of a valid lien). 
Although substantial compliance has its place in the 
law to prevent creditors from engaging in inequitable conduct, 
it simply does not apply to the facts of this case. This 
Court should reverse the decision of the trial court and 
remand for a decision denying redemption for failure to comply 
with Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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POINT IV 
WIND RIVER'S REDEMPTION IS INVALID FOR FAILURE TO POST 
THE PROPER AMOUNT FOR REDEMPTION, WHICH IS THE FULL VALUE OF 
TECH-FLUID'S LIEN, 
As previously indicated, Tech-Fluid bid $4000 at the 
sale* Wind River Resources posted $4310.00 as redemption on 
the well. This is not the proper amount in order to redeem 
pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3). Wind River must post the amount of 
the lien with interest. 
Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
The property may be redeemed from the purchaser 
within six months after the sale on paying the 
amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon . 
. . and, if the purchaser is also a creditor 
having a lien prior to that of the person 
seeking redemption, other than the judgment 
under which sad purchaser was made, the amount 
of such lien with interest. (Emphasis added) 
"Purchaser11 means Tech-Fluid. In order to properly 
redeem, Wind River needed to post the amount of the lien with 
interest. 
At trial, Wind River argued that the underlined 
provision only applies to other lienholders or creditors 
seeking to redeem and not an assignee of the judgment debtor 
who need only post the sale price to satisfy the debt and 
extinguish the lien. This conclusion is flawed because it 
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fails to recognize the specific language in Rule 69(f)(5) 
which provides: "If the judgment debtor redeems he must make 
the same payments as are required to effect redemption by a 
creditor." 
Other courts looking at the issue have specifically 
held that the entire amount of the debt must be paid in order 
to redeem, not just the sale price* The seminal case is 
Collins v, Riggs, 81 U.S. 491, 20 L.Ed.2d 723 (1872), wherein 
the Court held: 
To redeem property which has been sold under a 
mortgage for less than the mortgage debt, it is 
not sufficient to tender the amount of the 
sale. The whole mortgage debt must be tendered 
or paid into court. The party offering to 
redeem, proceeds upon the hypothesis that, as to 
him, the mortgage has never been foreclosed it 
is still in existence. Therefore he can only 
lift it by paying it. The money will be subject 
to distribution between the mortgagee and the 
purchaser, in equitable proportions, so as to 
reimburse the latter his purchase money and pay 
the former the balance of this debt. 
Id. at 81 U.S. at 498, 20 L.Ed.2d at 724. 
Numerous courts have adopted the Collins rule 
regarding the amount necessary for redemption. Sun First 
National Bank of Orlando v. R.G.G., 348 So.2d 621 (Fla App. 
1977); United States v. Brosnan, 264 F.2d 762, 766 (3rd Cir. 
1959); Garuich v. Associates Financial Services Co., 435 So.2d 
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30 (Ala 1983) (when mortgagee buys at foreclosure sale the 
amount of the debt is treated as the purchase price rather 
than the amount bid.) 
This rule was codified in 28 U.S.C. 2410(d)(1) which 
requires the United States to post the amount of the debt, not 
just the sale price, if it wants to redeem property sold under 
a lien. 
Policy reasons support this court adopting the Collins 
rule. The creditor takes security for payment of the debt. 
Before the debtor should be entitled to redeem the property 
free and clear of the creditors lien, the underlying debt 
should be paid in full. All parties would obtain exactly what 
they were entitled to under their contractual rights and the 
debtors property rights are protected. 
The alternative would be to allow the debtor to redeem 
by paying the sale bid price but not extinguish the lien. 
This rule, although more cumbersome, appears to be the current 
rule of law regarding redemption. In Bennion v. Amoss, 530 
P.2d 810 (Utah 1975), this Court held that a redemption by the 
assignee of the judgment debtor "restores the property to the 
same condition as if no sale had been attempted." icL at 
812. Rule 69(f)(5) provides "if the debtor redeems, the 
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effect of the sale is terminated and he is restored to his 
estate. 
Thus a redemption terminates the effect of the sale 
leaving the property still encumbered by the Tech-Fluid lien. 
Tech-Fluid can at any time notice up a new sale to obtain 
payment of its lien. Wind River argued the Tech-Fluid lien 
was extinguished by the sale. The above quoted language 
however shows that it was restored by redemption "as if no 
sale had taken place." The better rule of law would require 
the debtor to post the entire amount of the lien in order to 
redeem and Tech-Fluid urges this Court to adopt that 
interpretation of Rule 69. 
CONCLUSION 
Tech-Fluid respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with 
instructions to issue the Sheriff's Deed to Tech-Fluid. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 1988. 
McRAE & DeLAND 
HARRY H./SOUVM.L ^ 
Attoxn«y for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OP DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered 
four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to Clark B. Allred, Attorney for Respondent, 363 
East Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84078 on this 21st day of 
July, 1988. 
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Ettiibrr" A 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #22X7 
McRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, UT 84078 
(801) 789-1666 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERIVCES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY 
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., 
and DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body 
politic, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 85-CV-13D 
This Court, having heretofore entered it's Order 
February 10, 1986, that defendants Sam Oil, Inc., Walker Energy 
Group, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. and Duchesne County, a Body politic, 
within 10 days file proof with this Court of any evidence of 
ownership in that certain oil well and appurtenances thereto known 
as 13ND-1 and no proof of ownership having been filed therein by 
any of these defendants, IT IS ORDERED that their answers be 
stricken and that a judgment of foreclosure issue in favor of 
plaintiff as against said oil well. 
FILED 
04^ 
7th DISTRICT COURT DUCHESNE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FEB 251986 
ROGER K. MARETT, 0«K 
This Court# having been advised that defendant 
Paiute Oil & Mining Corp. is under the jurisdiction of the 
United Starters Bankruptcy Court/ District of Utah/ plaintiff's 
rights as between this defendant will not be adjudicated at 
this time. .^  
DATED this ffy day of February/ 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
RICHARD C. DAVINDSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postaqe prepaid/ a copy 
of the foregoing to the following on this Ir* day of February, 1986, 
Mr. Kent H. Murdock 
Attorney for Defendant Chevron 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
Dennis L. Draney 
Attorney for Duchesne County 
P.O. Box 206 
Duchesne, UT 84021 
Brent V. Manning 
Attorney for Walker 
50 South Main Street, #900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes 
Attorney for Paiute 
311 South State, #280 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
042^ 
Mr. Roland P. Uresk 
Attorney for Saro Oil 
156 North 200 East 
Roosevelt, UT 84066 
04;.'o 
E^hib+ & 
ROBERT M. McRAE, #2217 
MCRAE & DeLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP DUCHESNE COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
TECH-FLUID SERVICES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORP., 
SAM OIL, INC., WALKER ENERGY 
GROUP, CHEVRON U.S.A. INC., and 
DUCHESNE COUNTY, a body politic, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. 85-CV-13D 
A certified copy of the Release of Automatic Stay 
provisions of the U. S. Bankruptcy Act having been filed with 
this Order releasing the automatic stay provision as it may 
apply to Paiute Oil & Mining Corp., IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
the Sheriff of Duchesne County post and conduct a public sale 
as provided for by law in the Mechanic Lien Foreclosure Act. 
DATED thi day of May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
thDISTRlCTCOUFrrOUCHESK 
j UN t) 1987 
HOGEHK.MAtttTi.UerK 
DENNIS L. DRANEY 
District Court Judge 
042b 
L. A. DEVER, #0875 
McRAE & OeLAND 
Attorneys for Tech-Fluid 
209 East 100 North 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: 789-1666 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
In re: 
PAIUTE OIL AND MINING 
CORPORATION, 
Debtor. 
Bankruptcy No. 84C-02620 
(Chapter 7) 
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF FROM AUTOMATIC STAY 
AND ABANDONMENT 
The motion of Tech-Fluids for relief from automatic 
stay came before the Court; and no objections having been 
filed to the motions; and after filing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the automatic stay of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code is terminated as to Tech-Fluids, effective upon entry of 
this Order. The trustee is ordered to abandon the bankrupt's 
interest in Well ND13-1. 
DATED this /^T day May, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Rule 5003 ,'cx Designation 
J Clerk .-. c ]••-. r?eJ to zr,i*r a copy 
j"tor into the Court's Order Book, 
fcntoy into Order Book not necessary. 
/" v 
1
 #11 r^%*§oWtth9u^xed and «>«,.-
is a true and complete copy of a documen; c 
file in the United States Bankruptcy CO«J 
for the District of Utah. 
Dated: W 18 jggj .-
0427 Attest: •-. C **jcs ^ - • ' ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a copy of the Order in the Seventh Judicial District Court 
and a copy of the Certified Order Granting Relief From Automatic 
Stay and Abandonment to the following on this &<?rtj day 
of ttffi 1987. 
Ms. Harriet E. Styler 
8 East Broadway, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mr. Richard Johns 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
ROBE 
04^6 
cxinu * 
ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS 
Paiute Oil ^tyjyjfrl&A£?£P3££t*on' a u t a h corporation, 
hereby assigns and conveys* to Wind River, Resources Corporation/ 
a Utah corporation/ all of Paiute's right/ title and interest 
in the property described below/ plus all of Paiute's right to 
redeem said property from the sale held on July 2# 1987 
pursuant to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid 
Services/ Inc. vs. Paiute Oil * Mining Corp./ Civil No. 
85-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne 
County/ State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is 
hereby authorized to take any and all actions necessary to 
redeem said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute 
Oil & Mining Corporation. 
The property to be redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Se^ion 13/ Township 
3 South/ Range 5 Westf^jbuchesne County, 
Utah/ together with all rights/ privi-
leges / franchise/ easements/ equipment/ 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
EXECUTED the S/c^  day of U&*S*^hi^ , 198T • Ite. 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION 
By: l]al^lkj^tl^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day otfJs)iSi*y-\*~> / 198^ , personally 
appeared before me, UEA€fc k ^ ^ ^ - ^ j / who, being by me duly 
sworn, did say/ that he is .fete A J^^ST^VQf^ of Paiute Oil & 
Mining Corporation/ and that this instrument was signed, in 
behalf of .said corporation by authority of its bylaws# and said 
yO&CpgF (Wfb^AJ acknowledged to <~Mne that said 
corporation executed the sa: 
My/Commission Expires: 
BtfrtbH* D 
itU Ftrst Security8an* °fUtah' N-A-
Salt Lake G/y, Utah 
f " D U C H E S N E COUNTY SHERIFF** 
Office No. 0 5 2 l a 
848452921 
D,fc 12Z31/87 
SO-1042 1 
m 
i 
• • I , 3 1 0 . 0 0 " 
•KA.SN •:* iil?..; *.X v.<> H C> i . W* £l\i* W W C U $ , 
[OK 13-ND-l WELL /Utifor^Mllfc 
Signature by: DtmJnmSecmOf Amk#7< •It*. .V.A.: Authorized Signatur 
i:0 2 23 101, 2 2<: a»*li&75&7 81,81,52^21 
ASSIGNMENT OF REDEMPTION RIGHTS 
Paiute Oil *„ty%£±y&A£9£PS££t±on' * Utah corporation# 
hereby assigns and conveys,*to Wina River Resources Corporation, 
a Utah corporation, all of Paiute's right, title and interest 
in the property described below, plus all of Paiute's right to 
redeem said property from the sale held on July 2, 1987 
pursuant to an execution issued in the case of Tech-Fluid 
Services, Inc. vs. Paiute Oil * Mining Corp., Civil No. 
85-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne 
County, State of Utah. Wind River Resources Corporation is 
hereby authorized to take any and all actions necessary to 
redeem said property on its own behalf in the stead of Paiute 
Oil a Mining Corporation. 
The property to be redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 Westf^buchesne County, 
Utah, together with all rights, privi-
leges , franchise, easements, equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
EXECUTED the S/*/- day of U&< &^hi^* , 198T . 
PAIUTE OIL & MINING CORPORATION 
By: LJg//^^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
* s s 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the l*f day ofrJvc/^^ , 198fr , personally 
appeared before me, tJ&xefc ^ ^ i^^^^" who, being by me duly 
sworn, did say, that he is «fetee A tei^E^TO^ of Paiute Oil * 
Mining Corporation, and that this instrument was signed, in 
behalf of
 Ksaid corporation by authority of its bylaws, and said 
i*J&CX€F W(h30AJ acknowledged to -Nine that said 
corporation executed the sa 
My/Commission Expires; 
Mm. 
to<m b + F 
NOTICE OP REDEMPTION 
TO: The Sheriff of Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on this date, Wind River 
Resources Corporation, a Utah corporation, redeemed the fol-
lowing property from your sale thereof to Tech-Fluid Services, 
Inc. on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution on a judgment 
rendered in the case of Tech-Fluid Services, Inc. vs. Paiute 
Oil & Mining Corp., et al, Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the 
Seventh Judicial District Court of Duchesne County, State of 
Utah. The certificate of sale shows a purchase price of 
$4,000. This amount plus interest of $240 and posting costs of 
$70, for a total of $4,310 is hereby tendered to you in 
accordance with Rule 69(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The property redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 WestjJfBuchesne County, 
Utah, together with all rights, privi-
leges, franchise, easements, equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
Wind River Resources Corporation claims the right to 
redeem the above property on the basis that it has received an 
assignment from the judgment debtor of the judgment debtor's 
redemption rights so that Wind River Resources Corporation is 
the successor in interest of the judgment debtor for purposes 
of redemption in accordance with Rule 69(f)(1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Attached hereto and incorporated by 
reference is an assignment of said redemption rights from the 
judgment debtor. 
C^// IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Notice is executed on 
= * 
WIND RIVER RESOURCES CORPORATION 
By!
 fU^^~i-
- 2 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss< 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the / day of fpij\JUL6^\ , 198J2./ personally 
appeared before me ^ T^M^xVHg.VVlg^ /who, being by me duly 
sworn, did say, that he is the W&*(b'C^>T~ of Wind River 
Resources Corporation, and that the attached Notice of Redemp-
tion was signed in bej^fv^of said corporation by authority of 
its bylaws, and said *Tty\|JftW^  acknowledged to me 
that said corporation executed the same. 
N A A _ 
Iry PubliKTN j | 
Residing at: \ f t f r ^ , r N UM 
My Commission Expires: 
SHERIFF'S REDEMPTION CERTIFICATE 
I 
The undersignedi acting on behalf of the Sheriff of 
Duchesne County, Utah, hereby certifies that on this date I 
received from Wind River Resources Corporation, a Utah corpora-
tion, the sum of $4,310 in full redemption of the tract of land 
and the property described below, from the sale thereof by the 
Sheriff of Duchesne County, Utah to Tech-Fluid Services# Inc. 
on July 2, 1987 pursuant to an execution issued on a judgment 
in Civil Case No. 85-CV-13D in the Seventh Judicial District 
Court of Duchesne County, State of Utah. 
The property redeemed is described as follows: 
All operating and leasehold interest in 
the Paiute-Walker #13-ND-1 Well located 
at 820 FNL 932 FEL Section 13, Township 
3 South, Range 5 West,A"&uchesne County, 
Utah, together with all rights, privi-
leges, franchise, easements, equipment, 
machinery or appliances appurtenant 
thereto. 
As support for and proof of its right to redeem, the 
redemptioner produced an assignment of redemption rights from 
the judgment debtor, Paiute Oil & Mining Corporation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Certificate 
at Duchesne, Utah on *~^\ o , ^  < t 1988 . 
• S I r O x/ / , C) ~. rl i . 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF DUCHESNE ) 
On the J day of M ^ A ^ t ^ ^ ^ , 198_£, personally 
appeared before me l^VT^icc^ HfrgtUSOAJ vttfe"signer of the above 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
My Commission Expires 
Notary Publico _ . 
Raiding at: V%^r7Vr(>fef 
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In any particular case, especially a reorganization case, the determination of 
which entity should be entitled to the difference between the going concern value 
and the liquidation value must be based on equitable considerations arising from 
the facts of the case. Finally, the determination of value is binding only for the 
purposes of the specific hearing and is not to have a res judicata effect. 
The first method of adequate protection outlined is the making of cash payments 
to compensate for the expected decrease in value of the opposing entity's interest. 
This provision is derived from In re Bermec Corporation, 445 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 
1971), though in that case it is not clear whether the payments offered were 
adequate to compensate the secured creditors for their loss. The use of periodic 
payments may be appropriate where, for example, the property in question is 
depreciating at a relatively fixed rate. The periodic payments would be to 
compensate for the depreciation and might, but need not necessarily, be in the 
same amount as payments due on the secured obligation. 
The second method is the fixing of an additional or replacement lien on other 
property of the debtor to the extent of the decrease in value or actual consump-
tion of the property involved. The purpose of this method is to provide the 
protected entity with an alternative means of realizing the value of the original 
property, if it should decline during the case, by granting an interest in 
additional property from whose value the entity may realize its loss. This is 
consistent with the view expressed in Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 311 
U.S. 273 (1940), where the Court suggested that it was the value of the secured 
creditor's collateral, and not necessarily his rights in specific collateral, that was 
entitled to protection. 
The section makes no provision for the granting of an administrative priority as 
a method of providing adequate protection to an entity as was suggested in In re 
Yale Express System, Inc., 384 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1967), because such protection 
is too uncertain to be meaningful. (S. Rept. No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266, 
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) pp. 49, 53, 54.) 
Section 361 of the House amendment represents a compromise between H.R. 
8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment regarding the issue of 
"adequate protection" of a secured party. The House amendment deletes the 
provision found in section 361(3) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House. It would 
have permitted adequate protection to be provided by giving the secured party 
an administrative expense regarding any decrease in the value of such party's 
collateral. In every case there is the uncertainty that the estate will have 
sufficient property to pay administrative expenses in full. 
Section 361(4) of H.R. 8200 as passed by the House is modified in section 361(3) 
of the House amendment to indicate that the court may grant other forms of 
adequate protection, other than an administrative expense, which will result in 
the realization by the secured creditor of the indubitable equivalent of the 
creditor's interest in property. In the special instance where there is a reserve 
fund maintained under the security agreement, such as in the typical bondholder 
case, indubitable equivalent means that the bondholders would be entitled to be 
protected as to the reserve fund, in addition to the regular payments needed to 
service the debt. Adequate protection of an interest of an entity in property is 
intended to protect a creditor's allowed secured claim. To the extent the 
protection proves to be inadequate after the fact, the creditor is entitled to a first 
priority administrative expense under section 507(b). 
In the special case of a creditor who has elected application of creditor making 
an election under section 1111(b)(2), that creditor is entitled to adequate 
protection of the creditor's interest in property to the extent of the value of the 
collateral not to the extent of the creditor's allowed secured claim, which is 
inflated to cover a deficiency as a result of such election. (124 Cong. Rec. H 
11092 (Sept. 28, 1978).) 
11 USCS § 362, Automatic stay 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 
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301, 302, or 303 of this title [11 USCS § 301, 302, or 303], or an application filed 
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 
78eee(a)(3)) [15 USCS § 78eee(a)(3)], operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, 
of— 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of 
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the 
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the 
case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.], or to recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS 
§§ 101 et seq.]; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a 
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title [11 
USCS §§ 101 et seq.]; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the 
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien 
to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement 
of the case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.]; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.]; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commence-
ment of the case under this title [11 USCS § 101 et seq.] against any claim 
against the debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States 
Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title [11 USCS 
§301, 302, or 303], or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)) [15 USCS § 78eee(a)(3)], 
does not operate as a stay— 
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of 
a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor; 
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance, 
or support from property that is not property of the estate; 
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in 
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such 
perfection under section 546(b) of this title [11 USCS § 546(b)] or to the extent 
that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section 
547(e)(2)(A) of this title [11 USCS § 547(e)(2)(A)]; 
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation 
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental 
unit's police or regulatory power; 
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment, 
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a 
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory 
power; 
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, 
forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clear-
ing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection with commodity 
contracts, as defined in section 761(4) of this title [11 USCS §761(4)], forward 
contracts, or securities contracts, as defined in section 741(7) of this title [11 
USCS § 741(7)], that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a 
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margin payment, as defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title [11 USCS 
§§ 741(5), 761(15)], or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this 
title [11 USCS § 741(8)], arising out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, 
or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held by or due 
from such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial 
institutions, or securities clearing agency to margin, guarantee, or secure, or 
settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts; 
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo participant, of any 
mutual debt and claim under or in connection with repurchase agreements that 
constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as 
defined in section 741(5) or 761(15) of this title [11 USCS §741(5) or 761(15)], 
or settlement payment, as defined in section 741(8) of this title [11 USCS 
§ 741(8)], arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or other 
property held by or due from such repo participant to margin, guarantee, secure 
or settle repurchase agreements; 
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any action by 
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage or 
deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by the 
Secretary is insured or was formerly insured under the National Housing Act 
and covers property, or combinations of property, consisting of five or more 
living units; 
(9) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a 
governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency; 
(10) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a lessor to the debtor 
under a lease of nonresidential real property that has terminated by the expira-
tion of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during a case 
under this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.] to obtain possession of such property; or 
(11) under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotiable 
instrument and the giving of notice of and protesting dishonor of such an 
instrument; 
(12) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days after the 
filing of such petition, of the commencement or continuation, and conclusion to 
the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a debtor subject to 
reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title [11 USCS §§ 1101 et seq.] and 
which was brought by the Secretary of Transportation under the Ship Mortgage 
Act, 1920 (46 App. U.S.C 911 et seq.) [46 USCS §§911 et seq.] (including 
distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet 
mortgage, or a security interest in or relating to a vessel under construction, held 
by the Secretary of Transportation under section 207 or title XI of the Merchant 
Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively) [46 USCS 
§ 1117 or §§ 1271 et seq., respectively], or under applicable State law; or 
(13) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days after the 
filing of such petition, of the commencement or continuation, and conclusion to 
the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a debtor subject to 
reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title [11 USCS §§ 1101 et seq.] and 
which was brought by the Secretary of Commerce under the Ship Mortgage Act, 
1920 (46 App. U.S.C. 911 et seq.) [46 USCS §§911 et seq.] (including distribu-
tion of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet mortgage in a 
vessel or a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest in a fishing facility 
held by the Secretary of Commerce under section 207 or title XI of the 
Merchant Marine Act, 1936 (46 App. U.S.C. 1117 and 1271 et seq., respectively) 
[46 USCS § 1117 or §§ 1271 et seq., respectively]. 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (0 of this section— 
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(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this 
section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate; and 
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until 
the earliest of— 
(A) the time the case is closed; 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or 
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title [11 USCS §§ 701 et seq.] 
concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 of this title 
[11 USCS §§ 901 et seq., 1101 et seq., 1201 et seq. or 1301 et seq.], the time a 
discharge is granted or denied. 
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall 
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by 
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay— 
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property 
of such party in interest; or 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this 
section, if— 
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and 
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. 
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief from the 
stay of any act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section, 
such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making such request, 
unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in effect 
pending the conclusion of, or as a result of, a final hearing and determination under 
subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a preliminary 
hearing, or may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this 
section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion 
of the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the 
conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a prelimi-
nary hearing, then such final hearing shall be commenced not later than thirty days 
after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing. 
(0 Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, shall 
grant such relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is 
necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, if 
such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice and a 
hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section. 
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning relief from 
the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section— 
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the 
debtor's equity in property; and 
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues. 
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section 
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys* fees, and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 
(Nov. 6, 1978, P. L. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2570; July 27, 1982, P. L. 97-
222, § 3, 96 Stat. 235; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98-353, Title HI, Subtitle A, § 304, 
Subtitle C, § 363(b), Subtitle F, § 392, Subtitle H, § 441, 98 Stat. 352, 363, 365, 371; 
Oct. 21, 1986, P. L. 99-509, Title V, Subtitle A, §5001, 100 Stat. 1911; Oct. 27, 
1986, P.L. 99-554, Title II, Subtitles B, C, §§ 2570), 283(d) 100 Stat. 3115, 3116.) 
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HISTORY: ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
References in text: 
The "National Housing Act", referred to in this section, is Act June 27, 1934, ch 
847, 48 Stat. 1246, which appears generally at 12 USCS §§ 1701 et seq. For full 
classification of this Act, consult USCS Tables volumes. 
Effective date of section: 
Section 402(a) of Act Nov. 6, 1978, provided that this section "shall take effect 
on October 1, 1979." 
Amendments: 
1982, Act July 27, 1982, in subsec. (a), in the introductory matter, inserted ", or 
an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection 
Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)),", and, in subsec (b), in the introductory 
matter, inserted ", or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities 
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 US.C. 78eee(a)(3)),", and substituted para. 
(6) for one which read: "under subsection (a)(7) of this section, of the setoff of 
any mutual debt and claim that are commodity futures contracts, forward 
commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options, warrants, rights to purchase 
or sell commodity futures contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell 
commodities or securities;". 
1984. Act July 10, 1984, in subsec. (a), in para. (1), inserted "action or", and in 
para. (3), inserted "or to exercise control over property of the estate"; in subsec 
(b), in para. (3), inserted "or to the extent that such act is accomplished within 
the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A)", in para. (6), inserted "[,]fi-
nancial institution," wherever appearing, [see Explanatory notes to this section], 
inserted "or due from" and substituted "secure, or settle commodity contracts" 
for "or secure commodity contracts", redesignated para. (7) as para. (8) and 
added a new para. (7) and, in para. (8) as redesignated, deleted "or" following 
the concluding semicolon, redesignated para. (8) as para. (9) and, in para. (9) as 
redesignated, substituted ", or" for the concluding period, and added new para. 
[(10)](9), and in para. (8) as redesignated, substituted "the" for "said", and 
purported to delete "or" following "units;", redesignated para. (8) as para. (9), 
and m para. [(10)](9) as so redesignated, substituted a semicolon for a concluding 
period; and added para. [(11)](10); in subsec. (c)(2)(B), substituted "or" for 
"and", in subsec. (d)(2), in the introductory matter, inserted "under subsection 
(a) of this section", in subsec (e), inserted "the conclusion of, and substituted 
two sentences beginning "The court shall order " and "If the hearing 
. . . ."for "If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing— 
"(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the 
final hearing under subsection (d) of this section, and 
"(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days after such 
preliminary hearing " 
Such Act further in subsec. (0, substituted "Upon request of a party in interest, 
the" for "The", and inserted "with or", and added subsec. (h). 
1986. Act Oct. 21, 1986 (applicable only to petitions [sic] filed under § 362 after 
August 1, 1986 and on or before December 31, 1989) replaced the period at the 
end of para. (b)(ll) with a semicolon and added paras (b)(12) and (b)(13). 
Act Oct. 27, 1986 (effective 30 days after enactment on 10/27/86, as provided by 
§ 302(a) of such Act, which appears as 28 USCS § 581 note), in subsec. (b), in 
para. (6), substituted ", financial institutions" for "financial institution," each 
place it appears, in the first para. (9), deleted "or" following the semicolon, 
redesignated the second para. (9) to be para. (10), and in para. (10), as so 
redesignated, purported to substitute ", or" for the period; however, such 
amendment was executed to insert "or" following the concluding semicolon to 
conform to the probable intent of Congress, and redesignated former para. (10) 
to be para. (11); and in subsec. (cX2)(C), inserted "12,". 
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Other provisions: 
Effective date of amendments made by Act July 10, 1984. Act July 10, 1984, P 
L 98-353, Title III, Subtitle K, § 553(a), 98 Stat 392, which appears as 11 
USCS § 101 note, provided that the amendments made to this section by such 
Act "become effective to cases filed 90 days after the date of enactment" on July 
10, 1984 
Report and recommendations as to (b)(12) and (b)(13) maritime provisions: Act 
Oct 21, 1986, P L 99-509, Title V, Subtitle A, § 5001, 100 Stat 1912 provides 
"Before July 1, 1989, the Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of 
Commerce each shall submit a report to the Committees on Merchant Marine 
and Fisheries, and the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
Committees on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Judiciary of the 
Senate on the effects of this subsection together with any recommendations for 
legislation " 
Legislative History 
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the 
bankruptcy laws It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors It stops 
all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions It permits the 
debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of 
the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy 
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection Without it, certain credi-
tors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's property 
Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and 
to the detriment of other creditors Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly 
liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated equally A race of 
diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that (H Rept No 95-595 
to accompany H R 8200, 95th Cong , 1st Sess (1977) pp 340-344) 
Subsection (a) defines the scope of the automatic stay, by listing the acts that are 
stayed by the commencement of the case The commencement or continuation, 
including the issuance of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceed-
ing against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case is stayed under paragraph (1) The scope 
of this paragraph is broad All proceedings are stayed, including arbitration, 
license revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings Proceedings in this 
sense encompasses civil actions as well, and all proceedings even if they are not 
before governmental tribunals 
The provision in this first paragraph prohibiting the issuance of process is 
designed to prevent the issuance of a wnt of execution by a judgment creditor of 
the debtor to obtain property that was property of the debtor before the case, but 
that was transferred, subject to the judgment lien, before the case Because the 
other paragraphs of this subsection refer only to property of the estate or 
property of the debtor, neither of which apply to this kind of transferred 
property, they would not prohibit pursuit of the transferred property by issuance 
of process Thus, the prohibition in this paragraph is included and the judgment 
creditor is allowed to proceed by way of foreclosure against the property, but not 
by a general wnt of execution (in the State court, or wherever the creditor 
obtained the judgment) against the debtor and all of the debtor's property 
The stay is not permanent There is adequate provision for relief from the stay 
elsewhere in the section However, it is important that the trustee have an 
opportunity to inventory the debtor's position before proceeding with the 
administration of the case Undoubtedly the court will lift the stay for proceed-
ings before specialized or nongovernmental tnbunals to allow those proceedings 
to come to a conclusion Any party desinng to enforce an order in such a 
proceeding would thereafter have to come before the bankruptcy court to collect 
assets Nevertheless, it will often be more appropnate to permit proceedings to 
continue in their place of ongm, when no great prejudice to the bankruptcy 
estate would result, in order to leave the parties to their chosen forum and to 
relieve the bankruptcy court from many duties that may be handled elsewhere 
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(H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 
340-344.) 
Section 362(a)(1) of the House amendment adopts the provision contained in the 
Senate amendment enjoining the commencement or continuation of a judicial, 
administrative, or other proceeding to recover a claim against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case. The provision is beneficial and 
interacts with section 362(a)(6), which also covers assessment, to prevent harass-
ment of the debtor with respect to pre-petition claims. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11093 
(Sept. 28, 1978.).) 
Paragraph (2) stays the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of 
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the bankruptcy 
case. Thus, execution and levy against the debtors' prepetition property are 
stayed, and attempts to collect a judgment from the debtor personally are stayed. 
(H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 
340-344.) 
Paragraph (3) stays any act to obtain possession of property of the estate (that is, 
property of the debtor as of the date of the filing of the petition) or property 
from the estate (property over which the estate has control or possession). The 
purpose of this provision is to prevent dismemberment of the estate. Liquidation 
must proceed in an orderly fashion. Any distribution of property must be by the 
trustee after he has had an opportunity to familiarize himself with the various 
rights and interests involved and with the property available for distribution. (H. 
Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-
344.) 
Paragraph (4) stays lien creation against property of the estate. Thus, taking 
possession to perfect a lien or obtaining court process is prohibited. To permit 
lien creation after bankruptcy would give certain creditors preferential treatment 
by making them secured instead of unsecured. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accom-
pany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Paragraph (5) stays any act to create or enforce a lien against property of the 
debtor, that is, most property that is acquired after the date of the filing of the 
petition, property that is exempted, or property that does not pass to the estate, 
to the extent that the lien secures a prepetition claim. Again, to permit 
postbankruptcy lien creation or enforcement would permit certain creditors to 
receive preferential treatment. It may also circumvent the debtors' discharge. (H. 
Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-
344.) 
Paragraph (6) prevents creditors from attempting in any way to collect a 
prepetition debt. Creditors in consumer cases occasionally telephone debtors to 
encourage repayment in spite of bankruptcy. Inexperienced, frightened, or ill-
counseled debtors may succumb to suggestions to repay notwithstanding their 
bankruptcy. This provision prevents evasion of the purpose of the bankruptcy 
laws by sophisticated creditors. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Paragraph (7) stays setoffs of mutual debts and credits between the debtor and 
creditors. As with all other paragraphs of subsection (a), this paragraph does not 
affect the right of creditors. It simply stays its enforcement pending an orderly 
examination of the debtor's and creditors' rights. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to 
accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. H977) pp.340-344.) 
Section 362(a)(7) contains a provision contaii.ad in H.R. 8200 as passed by the 
House. The differing provision in the Senate ai endment was rejected. It is not 
possible that a debt owing to the debtor may be ^set against an interest in the 
debtor. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11093, H 11093 (Sept. 2b, 1978).) 
Section 362(a)(8) is new. The provision stays the comm:ncement or continuation 
of any proceeding concerning the debtor before the U.S. Tix Court. (124 Cong. 
Rec. H 11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).) 
Subsection (b) lists five exceptions to the automatic stay. The effect of an 
exception is not to make the action immune from injunction. 
The court has ample other powers to stay actions not covered by the automatic 
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stay. Section 105, of proposed title 11, derived from Bankruptcy Act §2a(15), 
grants the power to issue orders neecssary or approriate [appropriate] to carry 
out the provisions of title 11. The bankruptcy courts are brought within the 
scope of the All Writs Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1651 (1970), and are given the powers 
of a court of law, equity, and admiralty (H.R. 8200, § 243(a), proposed 28 
U.S.C 1481). Stays or injunctions issued under these other sections will not be 
automatic upon the commencement of the case, but will be granted or issued 
under the usual rules for the issuance of injunctions. By excepting an act or 
action from the automatic stay, the bill simply requires that the trustee move the 
court into action, rather than requiring the stayed party to request relief from 
the stay. There are some actions, enumerated in the exceptions, that generally 
should not be stayed automatically upon the commencement of the case, for 
reasons of either policy or practicality. Thus, the court will have to determine on 
a case-by-case basis whether a particular action which may be harming the estate 
should be stayed. 
With respect to stays issued under other powers, or the application of the 
automatic stay, to governmental actions, this section and the other sections 
mentioned are intended to be an express waiver of sovereign immunity of the 
Federal government, and an assertion of the bankruptcy power over State 
governments under the Supremacy Clause notwithstanding a State's sovereign 
immunity. (H. Rept. No 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1977) pp. 340-344.) 
The first exception is of criminal proceedings against the debtor. The bankruptcy 
laws are not a haven for criminal offenders, but are designed to give relief from 
financial over-extension. Thus, criminal actions and proceedings may proceed in 
spite of bankruptcy. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Paragraph (2) excepts from the stay the collection of alimony, maintenance or 
support from property that is not property of the estate. This will include 
property acquired after the commencement of the case, exempted property, and 
property that does not pass to the estate. The automatic stay is one means of 
protecting the debtor's discharge. Alimony, maintenance and support obligations 
are excepted from discharge. Staying collection of them, when not to the 
detriment of other creditors (because the collection effort is against property that 
is not property of the estate), does not further that goal. Moreover, it could lead 
to hardship on the part of the protected spouse or children. (H. Rept. No. 95-
595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Paragraph (3) excepts any act to perfect an interest in property to the extent that 
the trustee's rights and powers are limited under section 546(a) of the bank-
ruptcy code. That section permits postpetition perfection of certain liens to be 
effective against the trustee. If the act of perfection, such as filing, were stayed, 
the section would be nullified. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Paragraph (4) excepts commencement or continuation of actions and proceedings 
by governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. Thus, where a 
governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, 
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or 
regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the 
action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay. Paragraph (5) 
makes clear that the exception extends to permit an injunction and enforcement 
of an injunction, and to permit the entry of a money judgment, but does not 
extend to permit enforcement of a money judgment. Since the assets of the 
debtor are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy court, and since they 
constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by 
a governmental unit of a money judgment would give it preferential treatment to 
the detriment of all other creditors. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 
8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the stay under section 362(aXl) does not apply 
to affect the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a 
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governmental unit to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory power. 
This section is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit 
governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and 
not to apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in 
property of the debtor or property of the estate. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 
11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).) 
Paragraph (6) [of subsection (b)] excepts the setoff of any mutual debt and claim 
for commodity transactions. (S. Rept. No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) pp. 52, 53, 55.) 
Section 362(b)(6) of the House amendment adopts a provision contained in the 
Senate amendment restricting the exception to the automatic stay with respect to 
setoffs to permit only the setoff of mutual debts and claims. Traditionally, the 
right of setoff has been limited to mutual debts and claims and the lack of the 
clarifying term "mutual" in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House created an 
unintentional ambiguity. (124 Cong. Rec. J 11092, H 11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).) 
Mr. MATHIAS. 
It is the distinguished Senator's understanding that the provisons of section 
362(b)(6) of the bill before us will protect the right of a commodity broker, 
forward contract merchant, or clearing organization to liquidate or transfer an 
open commodity contract held or carried for a bankrupt pursuant to existing 
contractual rights and that such right will not be subject to any stay sought to be 
imposed under this act, State law or court order? 
Mr. DeConcini. Yes. (124 Cong. Rec S 17434 (Oct. 6, 1978).) 
Section 3(c) is intended to clarify that, despite the automatic stay of section 
362(a), a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, or securi-
ties clearing agency may set off a claim for a margin or settlement payment 
arising out of commodities contracts, forward contracts, or securities contract 
against cash, securities or other property which it is holding to margin, guaran-
tee, or secure such contracts, notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the party for 
whose account such cash, securities, or property is held. This section does not 
permit a setoff which would be unlawful under any applicable law or regulation 
(H. Rept. No. 97-420 to accompany H.R. 4935, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. (1982) p. 3.) 
Section 3(c) of H.R. 4935 would amend section 362(b)(6) of the code to clarify 
that a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, or securities 
clearing agency may set off a claim for a margin or settlement payment against 
cash, securities, or other property which it is holding, notwithstanding the 
bankruptcy of the party for whose account such cash, securities, or property is 
held and despite the automatic stay of section 362(a). This means that if a 
commodity or securities brokerage firm, forward contract merchant, commodity 
clearing organization, or securities clearing agency has a claim for a margin or 
settlement payment against the debtor arising, before or after the filing of the 
petiton, out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts— 
or the liquidation of those contracts—and holds cash, securities, or other 
property with respect to the same or other commodity contracts, forward 
contracts, or securities contracts, it would not be stayed from setting off that 
claim against such cash, securities, or other property, or against any amount 
with respect to such contracts that it would be required to pay. In the case of 
forward contracts the net amount due to or owing from the debtor would be the 
sum of the net amounts, if any, due or owing with respect to each such contract 
of the debtor. This section would not permit a setoff that would be unlawful 
under any applicable law or regulation. 
Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, I have a question regarding the scope of section 
3(c) of H.R. 4935, which basically would amend section 362(b)(6) of the code to 
exempt from the general stay of actions against a debtor the setoff of a claim 
against the debtor for a margin or settlement payment arising from a commodity 
contract, forward contract, or securities contract against cash, securities, or other 
property held by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, or stock 
broker to margin, guarantee or secure other contracts of the debtor. 
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The language of section 3(c) is more restrictive than that of section 25(bX3) of S. 
983, the parallel provision of Senate bankruptcy technical amendments bill, 
which would have exempted from the automatic stay the setoff of any "mutual 
debt and claim regarding futures contracts, forward contracts and other specified 
contracts. I understand that the purpose of the narrower language of section 3(c) 
is to prevent setoffs for charges such as commissions, or by entities such as 
banks, which are not necessary to achieve the market protection functions of 
section 362(b)(6). 
I too am concerned about achievement of these market protection functions. 
Accordingly, my question is whether a settlement payment owed to a customer 
with respect to a commodity contract, forward contract, or securities contract is 
property held by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, or stockbro-
ker to guarantee or secure the customers other contracts within the meaning of 
section 3(c), and may therefore be offset against a margin or settlement payment 
owed by the customer with respect to that or another contract. 
Mr. DOLE. Yes. (128 Cong. Rec. S 8132 S 8133 (July 13, 1982).) 
Paragraph (7) [(8) of subsection (b)] excepts actions by the Secretary of Housing 
and Urban Development to foreclose or take possession in a case of a loan 
insured under the National Housing Act. A general exception for such loans is 
found in current sections 263 and 517, the exception allowed by this paragraph 
is much more limited. 
Upon the court's finding that the debtor has no equity in the property subject to 
the stay and that the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization of 
the debtor, the subsection requires the court grant relief from the stay. To aid in 
this determination, guidelines are established where the property subject to the 
stay is real property. An exception to "the necessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion" requirement is made for real property on which no business is being 
conducted other than operating the real property and activities incident thereto. 
The intent of this exception is to reach the single-asset apartment type cases 
which involve primarily tax-shelter investments and for which the bankruptcy 
laws have provided a too facile method to relay conditions, but not the operating 
shopping center and hotel cases where attempts at reorganization should be 
permitted. Property in which the debtor has equity but which is not necessary to 
an effective reorganization of the debtor should be sold under section 363. 
Hearings under this subsection are given calendar priority to ensure that court 
congestion will not unduly prejudice the rights of creditors who may be 
obviously entitled to relief from the operation of the automatic stay. (S. Rept. 
No. 95-989 to accompany S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) pp. 52, 53, 55.) 
Section 362(b)(7) [(9)] of the House amendment permits the issuance of a notice 
of tax deficiency. The House amendment rejects section 362(b)(7) in the Senate 
amendment. It would have permitted a particular governmental unit to obtain a 
pecuniary advantage without a hearing on the merits contrary to the exceptions 
contained in sections 362(b)(4) and (5). (124 Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 11093 
(Sept. 28, 1978).) 
Subsection (c) of section 362 specifies the duration of the automatic stay. 
Paragraph (1) terminates a stay of an act against property of the estate when the 
property ceases to be property of the estate, such as by sale, abandonment, or 
exemption. It does not terminate the stay against property of the debtor if the 
property leaves the estate and goes to the debtor. Paragraph (2) terminates the 
stay of any other act on the earliest of the time the case is closed, the time the 
case is dismissed, or the time a discharge is granted or denied (unless the debtor 
is a corporation or partnership in a chapter 7 case). 
Subsection (c) governs automatic termination of the stay. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 
to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Subsections (d) through (g) govern termination of the stay by the court on the 
request of a party in interest. Subsection (d) requires the court, on request of a 
party in interest, to grant relief from the stay, such as by terminating, annulling, 
modifying, or conditioning the stay, for cause. The lack of adequate protection of 
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an interest in property of the party requesting relief from the stay is one cause 
for relief, but is not the only cause. As noted above, a desire to permit an action 
to proceed to completion in another tribunal may provide another cause. Other 
causes might include the lack of any connection with or interference with the 
pending bankruptcy case. For example, a divorce or child custody proceeding 
involving the debtor may bear no relation to the bankruptcy case. In that case, it 
should not be stayed. A probate proceeding in which the debtor is the executor 
or administrator of another's estate usually will not be related to the bankruptcy 
case, and should not be stayed. Generally, proceedings in which the debtor is a 
fiduciary, or involving postpetition activities of the debtor, need not be stayed 
because they bear no relationship to the purpose of the automatic stay, which is 
debtor protection from his creditors. The facts of each request will determine 
whether relief is appropriate under the circumstances. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to 
accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Section 362(d) of the House amendment represents a compromise between 
comparable provisions in the House bill and Senate amendment. Under section 
362(d)(1) of the House amendment, the court may terminate, annul, modify, or 
condition the automatic stay for cause, including lack of adequate protection of 
an interest in property of a secured party. It is anticipated that the Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure will provide that those hearings will receive priority on 
the calendar. Under section 362(d)(2) the court may alternatively terminate, 
annul, modify, or condition the automatic stay for cause including inadequate 
protection for the creditor. The court shall grant relief from the stay if there is 
no equity and it is not necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor. 
The latter requirement is contained in section 362(d)(2). This section is intended 
to solve the problem of real property mortgage foreclosures of property where 
the bankruptcy petition is filed on the eve of foreclosure. The section is not 
intended to apply if the business of the debtor is managing or leasing real 
property, such as a hotel operation, even though the debtor has no equity if the 
property is necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor. Similarly, if the 
debtor does have an equity in the property, there is no requirement that the 
property be sold under section 363 of title 11 as would have been required by the 
Senate amendment. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).) 
Subsection (e) provides a protection for secured creditors that is not available 
under present law. The subsection sets a time certain within which the bank-
ruptcy court must rule on the adequacy of protection provided of the secured 
creditor's interest. If the court does not rule within 30 days from a request for 
relief from the stay, the stay is automatically terminated with respect to the 
property in question. In order to accommodate more complex cases, the subsec-
tion permits the court to make a preliminary ruling after a preliminary hearing. 
After a preliminary hearing, the court may continue the stay only if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from the stay will prevail at 
the final hearing. Because the stay is essentially an injunction, the three stages of 
the stay may be analogized to the three stages of an injunction. The filing of the 
petition which gives rise to the automatic stay is similar to a temporary 
restraining order. The preliminary hearing is similar to the hearing on a 
preliminary injunction, and the final hearing and order is similar to a permanent 
injunction. The main difference lies in which party must bring the issue before 
the court. While in the injunction setting, the party seeking the injunction must 
prosecute the action, in proceedings for relief from the automatic stay, the 
enjoined party must move. The difference does not, however, shift the burden of 
proof. Subsection (g) leaves that burden on the party opposing relief from the 
stay (that is, on the party seeking continuance of the injunction) on the issue of 
adequate protection. 
At the expedited hearing under subsection (e), and at all hearings on relief from 
the stay, the only issue will be the claim of the creditor and the lack of adequate 
protection or existence of other cause for relief from the stay. This hearing will 
not be the appropriate time at which to bring in other issues, such as counter-
claims against the creditor on largely unrelated matters. Those counterclaims are 
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not to be handled in the summary fashion that the preliminary hearing under 
this provision will be. Rather, they will be the subject of more complete 
proceedings by the trustees to recover property of the estate or to object to the 
allowance of a claim. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Subsection (e) provides protection that is not always available under present law. 
The subsection sets a time certain within which the bankruptcy court must rule 
on the adequacy of protection provided for the secured creditor's interest. If the 
court does not rule within 30 days from a request by motion for relief from the 
stay, the stay is automatically terminated with respect to the property in 
question. To accommodate more complex cases, the subsection permits the court 
to make a preliminary ruling after a preliminary hearing. After a preliminary 
hearing, the court may continue the stay only if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the party opposing relief from the stay will prevail at the final hearing. 
Because the stay is essentially an injunction, the three stages of the stay may be 
analogized to the three stages of an injunction. The filing of the petition which 
gives rise to the automatic stay is similar to a temporary restraining order. The 
preliminary hearing is similar to the hearing on a preliminary injunction, and the 
final hearing and order are similar to the hearing and issuance or denial of a 
permanent injunction. The main difference lies in which party must bring the 
issue before the court. While in the injunction setting, the party seeking the 
injunction must prosecute the action, in proceedings for relief from the automatic 
stay, the enjoined party must move. The difference does not, however, shift the 
burden of proof. Subsection (g) leaves that burden on the party opposing relief 
from the stay (that is, on the party seeking continuance of the injunction) on the 
issue of adequate protection and existence of an equity. It is not, however, 
intended to be confined strictly to the constitutional requirement. This section 
and the concept of adequate protection are based as much on policy grounds as 
on constitutional grounds. Secured creditors should not be deprived of the benefit 
of their bargain. There may be situations in bankruptcy where giving a secured 
creditor an absolute right to his bargain may be impossible or seriously detrimen-
tal to the policy of the bankruptcy laws. Thus, this section recognizes the 
availability of alternate means of protecting a secured creditor's interest where 
such steps are a necessary part of the rehabilitative process. Though the creditor 
might not be able to retain his lien upon the specific collateral held at the time of 
filing, the purpose of the section is to insure that the secured creditor receives 
the value for which he bargained. 
The action commenced by the party seeking relief from the stay is referred to as 
a motion to make it clear that at the expedited hearing under subsection (e), and 
at hearings on relief from the stay, the only issue will be the lack of adequate 
protection, the debtor's equity in the property, and the necessity of the property 
to an effective reorganization of the debtor, or the existence of other cause for 
relief from the stay. This hearing will not be the appropriate time at which to 
bring in other issues, such as counterclaims against the creditor, which, although 
relevant to the question of the amount of the debt, concern largely collateral or 
unrelated matters. This approach is consistent with that taken in cases such as In 
re Essex Properties, Ltd., 430 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D.Cal. 1977), that an action 
seeking relief from the stay is not the assertion of a claim which would give rise 
to the right or obligation to assert counterclaims. Those counterclaims are not to 
be handled in the summary fashion that the preliminary hearing under this 
provision will be. Rather, they will be the subject of more complete proceedings 
by the trustee to recover property of the estate or to object to the allowance of a 
claim. However, this would not preclude the party seeking continuance of the 
stay from presenting evidence on the existence of claims which the court may 
consider in exercising its discretion. What is precluded is a determination of such 
collateral claims on the merits at the hearing. (S. Rept. No. 95-989 to accom-
pany S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) pp. 52, 53, 55.) 
Section 362(e) of the House amendment represents a modification of provisions 
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in H.R. 8200 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment to make clear 
that a final hearing must be commenced within 30 days after a preliminary 
hearing is held to determine whether a creditor will be entitled to relief from the 
automatic stay. In order to insure that those hearings will in fact occur within 
such 30-day period, it is anticipated that the rules of bankruptcy procedure 
provide that such final hearings receive priority on the court calendar. (124 
Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 11093 (Sept. 28, 1978).) 
Subsection (f) permits ex parte relief from the stay in situations in which 
irreparable damage might occur to the stayed party before there is opportunity 
for notice and a hearing under the usual procedure. The Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure will provide for a hearing soon after the issuance of any ex parte 
order under this subsection. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 340-344.) 
Section 362(g) places the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in 
collateral on the party requesting relief from the automatic stay and the burden 
on other issues on the debtor. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11092, H 11093 (Sept. 28, 
1978).) 
11 USCS § 363. Use, sale, or lease of property 
(a) In this section, "cash collateral" means cash, negotiable instruments, documents 
of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in 
which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest and includes 
the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of property subject to a security 
interest as provided in section 552(b) of this title [11 USCS § 552(b), whether 
existing before or after the commencement of a case under this title [11 USCS 
§§ 101 et seq.]. 
(b)(1) The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in 
the ordinary course of business, property of the estate. 
(2) If notification is required under subsection (a) of section 7A of the Clayton 
Act (15 U.S.C. 18a) [15 USCS § 18a] in the case of a transaction under this 
subsection, then— 
(A) notwithstanding subsection (a) of such section, such notification shall be 
given by the trustee; and 
(B) notwithstanding subsection (b) of such section, the required waiting period 
shall end on the tenth day after the date of the receipt of such notification, 
unless the court, after notice and hearing, orders otherwise. 
(c)(1) If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated under section 721, 
1108, 1304, 1203, or 1204 of this title [11 USCS §721, 1108, 1304, 1203, or 
1204] and unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee may enter into transac-
tions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the ordinary course 
of business, without notice or a hearing, and may use property of the estate in 
the ordinary course of business without notice or a hearing. 
(2) The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of 
this subsection unless— 
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or 
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in 
accordance with the provisions of this section. 
(3) Any hearing under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection may be a preliminary 
hearing or may be consolidated with a hearing under subsection (c) of this 
section, but shall be scheduled in accordance with the needs of the debtor. If the 
hearing under paragraph (2)(B) of this subsection is a preliminary hearing, the 
court may authorize such use, sale, or lease only if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the trustee will prevail at the final hearing under subsection (e) of 
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bility or ability, and does not prohibit imposition of requirements such as net 
capital rules, if applied nondiscriminatorily. 
In addition, the section is not exhaustive. The enumeration of various forms of 
discrimination against former bankrupts is not intended to permit other forms of 
discrimination. The courts have been developing the Perez rule. This section 
permits further development to prohibit actions by governmental or quasi-gov-
ernmental organizations that perform licensing functions, such as a State bar 
association or a medical society, or by other organizations that can seriously 
affect the debtors' livelihood or fresh start, such as exclusion from a union on the 
basis of discharge of a debt to the union's credit union. 
The effect of the section, and of further interpretations of the Perez rule, is to 
strengthen the anti-reaffirmation policy found in section 524(b). Discrimination 
based solely on nonpayment could encourage reaffirmations, contrary to the 
expressed policy. 
The section is not so broad as a comparable section proposed by the Bankruptcy 
Commission, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §4-508 (1975), which would have 
extended the prohibition to any discrimination, even by private parties. Never-
theless, it is not limiting either, as noted. The courts will continue to mark the 
contours of the anti-discrimination provision in pursuit of sound bankruptcy 
policy. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1977) pp. 366, 367.) 
SUBCHAPTER III—THE ESTATE 
11 USCS § 541. Property of the estate 
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title [11 
USCS § 301, 302, or 303] creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the 
following property, wherever located and by whomever held: 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case. 
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as 
of the commencement of the case that is— 
(A) the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the debtor; or 
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable 
claim against the debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor's spouse, to 
the extent that such interest is so liable. 
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b), 
363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title [11 USCS § 329(b), 363(n) 543, 550, 
553, or 723]. 
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered transferred to 
the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title [11 USCS § 510(c) or 551]. 
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if such 
interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition, 
and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after 
such date— 
(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance; 
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse, or 
of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or 
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit plan. 
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the 
estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual 
debtor after the commencement of the case. 
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of 
the case. 
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USCS § 101 note, provided that the amendments made to this section by such 
Act "become effective to cases filed 90 days after the date of enactment" on July 
10, 1984. 
Legislative History 
Paragraph (6) [of § 547(c)] governs prepetition setoff. Setoff, even though 
preferential, is protected if it occurred more than five days before the case, unless 
it is a setoff under circumstances which would invalidate it under section 553. If 
the setoff occurred within the five-day period, then it is avoidable only if the 
trustee may use, sell, or lease the property so recovered. 
This section preserves, with some changes, the right of setoff in bankruptcy cases 
now found in section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act. One exception to the right is the 
automatic stay, discussed in connection with proposed 11 U.S.C. 362. Another is 
the right of the trustee to use property under section 363 that is subject to a 
right of setoff. 
The section states that the right of setoff is unaffected by the bankruptcy code 
except to the extent that the creditor's claim is disallowed, the creditor acquired 
(other than from the debtor) the claim during the 90 days preceding the case 
while the debtor was insolvent, the debt being offset was incurred for the purpose 
of obtaining a right of setoff, while the debtor was insolvent and during the 90-
day prebankruptcy period, or the creditor improved his position in the 90-day 
period (similar to the improvement in position test found in the preference 
section, 547(c)(5)). Only the last exception is an addition to current law. 
As under section 547(f), the debtor is presumed to have been insolvent during 
the 90 days before the case. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) pp. 374, 377.) 
Section 547(c)(6) of the House bill is deleted and is treated in a different fashion 
in section 553 of the House amendment. 
Section 553 of the House amendment is derived from a similar provision 
contained in the Senate amendment, but is modified to clarify application of a 
two-point test with respect to set offs. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11097 (Sept. 28, 
1978).) 
11 USCS § 554. Abandonment of property of the estate 
(a) After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate 
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to 
the estate. 
(b) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may 
order the trustee to abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the 
estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate. 
(c) Unless the court orders otherwise, any property scheduled under section 521(1) 
of this title [11 USCS § 521(1)] not otherwise administered at the time of the closing 
of a case is abandoned to the debtor and administered for purposes of section 350 of 
this title [11 USCS §350]. 
(d) Unless the court orders otherwise, property of the estate that is not abandoned 
under this section and that is not administered in the case remains property of the 
estate. 
(Nov. 6, 1978, P. L. 95-598, Title I, § 101, 92 Stat. 2603; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98-
353, Title III, Subtitle H, § 468, 98 Stat. 380; Oct. 27, 1986, P.L. 99-554, Title II, 
Subtitle C, § 283(p), 100 Stat. 3118.) 
11 USCS § 554 
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Effective date of section: 
Section 402(a) of Act Nov. 6, 1978, provided that this section "shall take effect 
on October 1, 1979.". 
Amendments: 
1984. Act July 10, 1984, in subsecs. (a) and (b), inserted "and benefit"; 
substituted subsec. (c) for one which read: "Unless the court orders otherwise, 
any property that is scheduled under section 521(1) of this title and that is not 
administered before a case is closed under section 350 of this title is deemed 
abandoned."; and, in subsec. (d), deleted "section (a) or (b) of* preceding "this 
section". 
1986. Act Oct. 27, 1986 (effective 30 days after enactment on 10/27/86, as 
provided by § 302(a) of such Act, which appears as 28 USCS §581 note), in 
subsec. (c), substituted "521(1)" for "521(a)(1)". 
Other provisions: 
Effective date of amendments made by Act July 10, 1984. Act July 10, 1984, P. 
L. 98-353, Title III, Subtitle K, § 553(a), 98 Stat. 392, which appears as 11 
USCS § 101 note, provided that the amendments made to this section by such 
Act "become effective to cases filed 90 days after the date of enactment" on July 
10, 1984. 
Legislative History 
This section authorizes the court to authorize the trustee to abandon any 
property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequen-
tial value to the estate. Abandonment may be to any party with a possessory 
interest in the property abandoned. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 
8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) p. 377.) 
In order to aid administration of the case, subsection (b) deems the court to have 
authorized abandonment of any property that is scheduled under section 521(1) 
and that is not administered before the case is closed. That property is deemed 
abandoned to the debtor. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) p. 377.) 
Section 554(b) is new and permits a party in interest to request the court to 
order the trustee to abandon property of the estate that is burdensome to the 
estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate. (124 Cong. Rec. H 11098 
(Sept. 28, 1978).) 
Subsection (c) specifies that if property is neither abandoned nor administered it 
remains property of the estate. (H. Rept. No. 95-595 to accompany H.R. 8200, 
95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977) p. 377.) 
11 USCS § 555. Contractual right to liquidate a securities contract 
"The exercise of a contractual right of a stockbroker, financial institution, or 
securities clearing agency to cause the liquidation of a securities contract, as defined 
in section 741(7) [11 USCS § 741(7)], because of a condition of the kind specified in 
section 365(e)(1) of this title [11 USCS § 365(e)(1)] shall not be stayed, avoided, or 
Dtherwise limited by operation of any provision of this title [11 USCS §§ 101 et 
seq.] or by order of a court or administrative agency in any proceeding under this 
title [11 USCS §§ 101 et seq.] unless such order is authorized under the provisions 
of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78aaa et seq.) [15 
USCS §§ 78aaa et seq.] or any statute administered by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. As used in this section, the term "contractual right" includes a right 
set forth in a rule or bylaw of a national securities exchange, a national securities 
association, or a securities clearing agency. 
(July 27, 1982, P. L. 97-222, § 6(a), 96 Stat. 236; July 10, 1984, P. L. 98-353, Title 
III, Subtitle H, § 469, 98 Stat. 380.) 
11 USCS § 555 
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matter jurisdiction. Buchlcr v United States 
(1974, DC Cal) 384 F Supp 709. 
28 USCS § 2409a does not confer jurisdiction 
on federal courts; jurisdiction over quiet title 
action involving United States is provided specif-
ically by 28 USCS § 1346(0- Morrison v Morri-
son (1976, DC Tex) 408 F Supp 315. 
After United States disclaimed all interest in 
land, it was inappropriate for Federal District 
Court to retain jurisdiction of quiet title action, 
and action was dismissed pursuant to 28 USCS 
§ 2409a; court could not retain jurisdiction on 
theory of pendent jurisdiction. W. H. Pugh Coal 
Co. v United States (1976, DC Wis) 418 F Supp 
538. 
Annotations: 
Scope of Federal District Court's jurisdiction 
under 28 USCS §§ 1347, 2409, over suits by 
tenant in common or joint tenant for partition of 
lands where United States is one of tenants in 
common or joint tenants. 29 ALR Fed 571. 
3. Counterclaim 
Argument that since term "party defendant" 
is used in 28 USCS § 2409a, defendant can only 
present quiet title action via complaint and not 
by counterclaim was wholly without merit. 
United States v Phillips (1973, DC Neb) 362 F 
Supp 462. 
4. Disclaimer 
Federal District Court, pursuant to 28 USCS 
§ 2409a(d), confirmed disclaimer of United States 
in view of quitclaim deed which effectively con-
veyed interest of United States in property in 
question to state of Wisconsin. W. H. Pugh Coal 
Co. v United States (1976, DC Wis) 418 F Supp 
538. 
5. Equitable defenses against United States 
Contention that Congress intended by enact-
ment of 28 USCS § 2409a to expose Government 
to doctrines of estoppel and laches was rejected. 
Wackerii 
Supp 962. 
v Morton (1975, DC Idaho) 390 F 
6. Limitations period 
Plaintiffs who did not know of government's 
claim to land prior to 1962, and who amended 
their complaint to bring it within terms of 28 
USCS § 2409a in March, 1973 were not barred 
from bringing action by 12-year limitations pe-
riod of § 2409a. Wackerii v Morton (1975, DC 
Idaho) 390 F Supp 962. 
12-year limitations bar of 28 USCS § 2409a(f) 
begins to run on date when claim of United 
States became known or should have become 
known, and not on later date when statute was 
passed. Hatter v United States (1975, DC Cal) 
402 F Supp 1192. 
7. —Nature of claim asserted 
For purposes of limitations period, 28 USCS 
§ 24O9a(0 makes no distinction between legal or 
equitable claims but speaks only of disputes in 
title to real property in which United States 
claims interest. Hatter v United States (1975, 
DC Cal) 402 F Supp 1192. 
8. Sufficiency of complaint 
Complaint under 28 USCS § 2409a is insuffi-
cient and will be dismissed unless it states with 
particularity nature of plaintiffs' right, title or 
interest, circumstances under which land was 
acquired, right, title or interest claimed by 
United States, and date on which plaintiffs or 
their predecessors in interest knew or should 
have known of claims of United States. Buchler 
v United States (1974, DC Cal) 384 F Supp 709. 
Complaint failed to state claim upon which 
relief might be granted pursuant to 28 USCS 
§ 2409a, where complaint asserted that cloud 
upon title to unimproved realty was imposed by 
designation of lands to be adjacent lands within 
wild river area and by institution of eminent 
domain proceedings to acquire scenic easements 
over portions of lands. Middlefork Ranch, Inc. v 
Butz (1975, DC Idaho) 393 F Supp 624. 
§ 2410. Actions affecting property on which United States has lien 
(a) Under the conditions prescribed in this section and section 1444 of this 
title [28 USCS § 1444] for the protection of the United States, the United 
States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any district 
court, or in any State court having jurisdiction of the subject matter— 
(1) to quiet title to, 
(2) to foreclose a mortgage or other lien upon, 
(3) to partition, 
(4) to condemn, or 
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(5) of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader with respect to, 
real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a 
mortgage or other lien. 
(b) The complaint or pleading shall set forth with particularity the nature 
of the interest or lien of the United States. In actions or suits involving 
liens arising under the internal revenue laws, the complaint or pleading 
shall include the name and address of the taxpayer whose liability created 
the lien and, if a notice of the tax hen was filed, the identity of the internal 
revenue office which filed the notice, and the date and place such notice of 
lien was filed. In actions in the State courts service upon the United States 
shall be made by serving the process of the court with a copy of the 
complaint upon the United States attorney for the district in which the 
action is brought or upon an assistant United States attorney or clerical 
employee designated by the United States attorney in writing filed with the 
clerk of the court in which the action is brought and by sending copies of 
the process and complaint, by registered mail, or by certified mail, to the 
Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Colum-
bia. In such actions the United States may appear and answer, plead or 
demur within sixty days after such service or such further time as the 
court may allow. 
(c) A judgment or decree in such action or suit shall have the same effect 
respecting the discharge of the property from the mortgage or other lien 
held by the United States as may be provided with respect to such matters 
by the local law of the place where the court is situated. However, an 
action to foreclose a mortgage or other lien, naming the United States as a 
party under this section, must seek judicial sale. A sale to satisfy a hen 
inferior to one of the United States shall be made subject to and without 
disturbing the lien of the United States, unless the United States consents 
that the property may be sold free of its lien and the proceeds divided as 
the parties may be entitled. Where a sale of real estate is made to satisfy a 
lien prior to that of the United States, the United States shall have one 
year from the date of sale within which to redeem, except that with respect 
to a lien arising under the internal revenue laws the period shall be 120 
days or the period allowable for redemption under State law, whichever is 
longer, and in any case in which, under the provisions of section 505 of the 
Housing Act of 1950, as amended (12 U.S.C 1701k) [12 USCS § 1701k], 
and subsection (d) of section 1820 of title 38 of the United States Code [38 
USCS § 1820], the right to redeem does not arise, there shall be no right of 
redemption. In any case where the debt owing the United States is due, the 
United States may ask, by way of affirmative relief, for the foreclosure of 
its own lien and where property is sold to satisfy a first hen held by the 
United States, the United States may bid at the sale such sum, not 
exceeding the amount of its claim with expenses of sale, as may be directed 
by the head (or his delegate) of the department or agency of the United 
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States which has charge of the administration of the laws in respect to 
which the claim of the United States arises. 
(d) In any case in which the United States redeems real property under 
this section or section 7425 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [26 
USCS § 7425], the amount to be paid for such property shall be the sum 
of— 
(1) the actual amount paid by the purchaser at such sale (which, in the 
case of a purchaser who is the holder of the lien being foreclosed, shall 
include the amount of the obligation secured by such lien to the extent 
satisfied by reason of such sale), 
(2) interest on the amount paid (as determined under paragraph (1)) at 6 
percent per annum from the date of such sale, and 
(3) the amount (if any) equal to the excess of (A) the expenses 
necessarily incurred in connection with such property, over (B) the 
income from such property plus (to the extent such property is used by 
the purchaser) a reasonable rental value of such property. 
(e) Whenever any person has a lien upon any real or personal property, 
duly recorded in the jurisdiction in which the property is located, and a 
junior lien, other than a tax lien, in favor of the United States attaches to 
such property, such person may make a written request to the officer 
charged with the administration of the laws in respect of which the lien of 
the United States arises, to have the same extinguished. If after appropriate 
investigation, it appears to such officer that the proceeds from the sale of 
the property would be insufficient to wholly or partly satisfy the lien of the 
United States, or that the claim of the United States has been satisfied or 
by lapse of time or otherwise has become unenforceable, such officer shall 
so report to the Comptroller General who may issue a certificate releasing 
the property from such lien. 
(June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 972; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 119, 63 
Stat 105; July 7, 1958, P. L. 85-508, § 12(h), 72 Stat. 348; June 11, 1960, 
P. L. 85-507, § 1(20), 74 Stat. 201; Nov. 2, 1966, P. L. 89-719, Title II, 
§201, 80 Stat. 1147.) 
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES 
Prior law and revision: 
This section is based on Act Mar. 4, 1931, c. 515, §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, 46 Stat. 
1528, 1529; May 17, 1932, c. 190, 47 Stat. 158; June 25, 1936, c. 804, 
49 Stat. 1921; June 6, 1940, c. 242, 54 Stat. 234; Dec. 2, 1942, c. 656, 
§§ 1-3, 56 Stat. 1026 (§§ 901, 902, 904, and 905 of former Title 28). 
Provisions including the districts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, and the 
District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, in 
former 28 USCS § 901 were omitted as covered by "any district court." 
See 28 USCS §451. Provisions in former 28 USCS §902 relating to 
process were omitted as covered by Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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Amendments (with effective dates): 
1949. Act May 24, 1949 inserted the second [later third] sentence of 
subsec. (b) and "In such actions" and "such" preceding "service" in 
the third [later fourth] sentence. 
1958. Act July 7, 1958 (effective 1/3/59, by Proc. No. 3269, 24 Fed. 
Reg. 81, 73 Stat. c. 16, as required by §§ 1 and 8(c) of P. L. 85-508). 
Sec. 12(h) deleted "including the District Court for the Territory of 
Alaska," following "district court," in subsec. (a). 
1960. Act June 11, 1960, inserted "or by certified mail," in subsec. (b). 
1966. Act Nov. 2, 1966, substituted the dash and all that follows it for 
", to quiet title to or for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien 
upon real or personal property on which the United States has or 
claims a mortgage or other lien." in subsec. (a); inserted "or pleading" 
and the second sentence of subsec. (b); substituted "judgment or 
decree" for "judicial sale" and "the mortgage or other lien" for "liens 
and encumbrances", added the second sentence and the exception in 
the fourth sentence, and inserted "(or his delegate)" in the last sentence 
of subsec. (c); added subsec. (d); and redesignated former subsec. (d) to 
be(e). 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Interpleader, generally, 28 USCS §§ 1335, 1397, 2361. 
Removal of actions brought under 28 USCS § 2410 from state court to 
federal court, 28 USCS § 1444. 
This section referred to in 12 USCS § 1071k; 26 USCS §§ 7424, 7425, 7810; 
28 USCS § 1444; 38 USCS § 1820. 
RESEARCH GUIDE 
Am Jur. 
32 Am Jur 2d, Federal Practice and Procedure § 482. 
35 Am Jur 2d, Federal Tax Enforcement §§ 64, 65. 
47 Am Jur 2d, Judicial Sales §§ 137, 270, 271, 335, 336, 344, 348. 
55 Am Jur 2d, Mortgages §§ 9, 873, 890, 891. 
77 Am Jur 2d, United States § 122. 
Forms: 
10 Am Jur Legal Forms 2d, Judicial and Execution Sales § 158:52. 
11 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Federal Practice and Procedure, 
Form 1441. 
11 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Federal Tax Enforcement, Form 
21. 
18 Am Jur PI & Pr Forms (Rev ed), Mortgages, Form 154. 
Annotations: 
Construction and application of statute (28 USC § 2410(a)(c)) dealing 
with actions affecting property on which the United States has a lien. 5 
L Ed 2d 867. 
When period for filing petition for removal of civil action from State 
Court to Federal District Court begins to run under 28 USCS 
§ 1446(b). 16 ALR Fed 287. 
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Right to attack merits of assessment, in proceeding under 26 USC 
§ 7403 to enforce, or under 28 USC § 2410 to discharge, federal tax 
lien. 100 ALR2d 869. 
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS 
I. IN GENERAL (notes 1-8) 
II. APPLICATION TO PARTICULAR 
ACTIONS 
A. Actions to Quiet Title [28 USCS 
§ 24lO(aXl)] (notes 9-13) 
B. Actions to Foreclose Mortgage or 
Other Lien [28 USCS 
§ 24t0(aX2)] (notes 14-19) 
C. Interpleader Actions [28 USCS 
§ 2410(a)(5)] (notes 20, 21) 
D. Actions Involving Tax Liens (notes 
22-31) 
III. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
(notes 32-37) 
1. IN GENERAL 
1. Generally 
2. Purpose 
3. Waiver of immunity 
4. Construction, generally 
5. Interests of United States subject to adjudi-
cation 
6. Establishment of lien priorities 
7. Application of state law 
8. Administrative waiver of liens [28 USCS 
§ 2410(e)] 
II. APPLICATION TO PARTICULAR 
ACTIONS 
A. Actions to Quiet Title [28 USCS § 2410(a)(1)] 
9. Generally 
10. When action will not lie 
11. Judgment liens 
12. Tax liens 
13. Defective title 
B. Actions to Foreclose Mortgage or Other Lien 
[28 USCS § 2410(aX2)] 
14. When action will lie 
15. Effect of junior federal lien 
l^. FoTtclo&urc salt. 
17. Redemption, generally [28 USCS § 2410(c)] 
18. —Payment [28 USCS § 2410(d)] 
19. —Credit of lienor's account 
C Interpleader Actions [28 USCS § 2410(aX5)] 
20. Generally 
21. When action will lie 
D. Actions Involving Tax Liens 
22. Generally 
23. Attack on validity of lien, generally 
24. —Determination of title against which lien 
asserted 
25. Attack on validity of assessment 
26. Attack on enforcement of lien 
27. Standing to attack 
28. Resolution of conflicting tax liens 
29. Foreclosure of state tax liens 
30. Subrogation to tax lien 
31. Tax sales 
III. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
32. Jurisdiction of District Court, generally 
33. —Removal 
34. Pleading 
35. Joinder 
36. Stay of proceedings 
37. Effect of judgment 
I. IN GENERAL 
1. Generally 
Congress has power to establish rules govern-
ing state-created property rights in so far as 
these rights affect property rights of United 
States. United States v John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 301, 5 L Ed 2d 1, 81 S 
Ct l . 
28 USCS §2410 provides, inter alia, that 
United States may be named as party in state 
court civil action involving adjudication of lien 
claims, including those of United States. United 
States v Hunt (1975, CA10 Wyo) 513 F2d 129. 
1. Purpose 
Predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 was limited in 
purpose and application to situations involving 
quieting of title or foreclosing or mortgages or 
other hens on real or personal property, and 
clearing real estate tides of questionable or val-
ueless government liens. Schmitz v Societe Inter-
p o l a t e , ;V&&, DC DvsX 0$> 149 F Swp^ 751, 
cert den 387 US 908, 18 L Ed 2d 626, 87 S Q 
1684. 
28 USCS § 2410(a) was enacted for threefold 
purpose: (1) to permit joinder where lien of 
United States was junior to that foreclosed, (2) 
to permit inquiry by junior lienor into proce-
dural irregularities of United States lien, but not 
underlying assessment itself, and, (3) to permit 
discharge of United States liens that have been 
eliminated, but not yet canceled. Shaw v United 
States (1970, DC Vt) 321 F Supp 1267. 
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Purpose of predecessor of 28 USCS §2410 
was to waive federal government's sovereign 
immunity from suit in type of cases to which it 
refers and to authorize suit to be brought against 
United States Lavenburg v Universal Sportweai 
(1950) 198 Misc 318, 98 NYS2d 160 
3. Waiver of immunity 
Purpose of predecessor of 28 USCS §2410 
was merely to waive sovereign immunity from 
suit in certain types of cases, not to confer 
jurisdiction on courts to hear and determine 
such cases in ordinary sense Wells v Long 
(1947, CA9 Idaho) 162 F2d 842 
Predecessor of 28 USCS §2410 constituted 
mere waiver of immunity by United States, and 
its consent to be sued in actions within scope of 
such section Seattle Asso of Credit Men v 
United States (1957, CA9 Wash) 240 F2d 906, 
United States v Cless (1958, CA3 Pa) 254 F2d 
590; Remis v United States (1960, CA1 Mass) 
273 F2d 293 
By successful moving SOT dismissal as to it 
on grounds of sovereign immunity, United States 
indicated that it had or claimed no hen upon 
fund which was subject of litigation, within 
purview of predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 Bank 
of Hawau v Benchwick (1966, DC Hawaii) 249 
F Supp 74 
Government waives its sovereign immunity 
under 28 USCS § 2410 in those suits which seek 
to determine relative position of government hen 
on property, as against other lienors, and those 
suits which question validity of hen in reference 
to compliance or noncompliance with statutory 
and constitutional requirements of due process 
Yannicelli v Nash (1973, DC NJ) 354 F Supp 
143 
28 USCS § 2410 waives sovereign immunity of 
United States where Government is named as 
party in civil action to quiet title to real or 
personal property on which United States "has 
or claims a mortgage or other hen", § 2410 is 
not jurisdictional grant Globe Products Corp v 
United States (1974, DC Md) 386 F Supp 319 
Predecessor to 28 USCS §2410 did not in-
clude consent of United States to be sued where 
United States was claiming title and not hen 
Sissman v Chicago Title & Trust Co (1941) 375 
111 514, 32 NE2d 132 
4. Construction, generally 
Both 26 USCS §7424, under which pnvate 
lienor may file petition in federal District Court 
for leave to file action for final determination of 
all claims to or hens upon property to which 
federal tax hen has attached, and predecessor of 
28 USCS § 2410 are purely permissive in tenor 
United States v Brosnan (1960) 363 US 237, 4 L 
Ed 2d 1192, 80 SCt 1108 
28 USCS § 2410, as waiver of sovereign immu-
nity of United States, must be strictly construed 
Haggard v Lancaster (1970, DC Miss) 320 F 
Supp 1252 
5. Interests of United States subject to adjudica-
tion 
Predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 did not apply 
whefe United States claimed absolute title to real 
property involved Riordan v Ferguson (1945, 
CA2 NY) 147 F2d 983, Bertie's Apple Valley 
Farms v United States (1973, CA9 Idaho) 476 
F2d 291, Wells v Long (1946, DC Idaho) 68 F 
Supp 671, affd (CA9 Idaho) 162 F2d 842, Hull v 
Tollefson (1956, DC ND) 138 F Supp 315, 
Brown v Johnson (1974, DC Tex) 373 F Supp 
973 
Predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 did not autho-
rize action brought for purpose of terminating 
consent agreement Ford Bros & Co v Edding-
ton Dtfkfflmg Co (TO&, E>C ?a) 30 ? Supp 1M 
Provisions of predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 
did not authonze suit to set aside pnvate sale by 
pnvate party, alleged to have been authorized by 
Internal Revenue Service, with understanding 
that no bid would be accepted unless approved 
by Internal Revenue Service, such action was not 
withm actions named for which immunity was 
waived by 28 USCS § 2410 Baumohl v Colum-
bia Jewelry Co (1955, DC Md) 127 F Supp 865 
Action instituted by plaintiff against United 
States under predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 to 
recover sum of money which allegedly was 
wrongfully given by third party to collector of 
internal revenue, and thereafter placed in United 
States Treasury at time when plaintiff possessed 
hen on such fund, superior to tax hen urged by 
collector in gaining possession of money, was not 
action "affecting property on which United 
States has a hen" as contemplated by predeces-
sor of 28 USCS § 2410(a) Tn-State Ins Co v 
United States (1955, DC Okla) 129 F Supp 115 
Provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410 did not 
apply to suit by plaintiff to restrain government 
from collecting penalties for violations of acts of 
Congress fixing wheat quotas, even though stat-
ute provided for hen upon entire crop of wheat 
produced on farm for amount of penalty for 
excess grown Shinaberry v United States (1956, 
DC Mich) 142 F Supp 413, affd (CA6 Mich) 242 
F2d 758, cert den 353 US 976, 1 L Ed 2d 1137, 
77 S Ct 1060 
Absent its consent to be sued, District Court 
did not have jurisdiction over United States in 
action for specific performance of agreement 
between plaintiffs and certain of defendants for 
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sale of real estate, on which it was alleged that 
agency of United States held mortgage. Shaw v 
Rippel (1963, DC 111) 224 F Supp 77. 
Predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 applied only 
to suits relating to government liens, and did not 
apply to suit against United States in which it 
was alleged in complaint that United States had 
attempted condemnation of land in which plain-
tiffs owned mineral interests and that condemna-
tion proceedings did not vest title to minerals in 
United States, but that United States, notwith-
standing lack of title, committed trespasses upon 
mineral interests. Stewart v United States (1957, 
CA5 Tex) 242 F2d 49. 
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not include situa-
tions where United States claims title interest, as 
distinguished from lien interest; court would not 
extend meaning of former § 2410 so as to hold 
that Congress consented to suit against United 
States in such situation. Zager v United States 
(1966, DC Wis) 256 F Supp 396. 
Funds deposited as bail for criminal defendant 
are not subject to lien of government so as to 
subject government to action under predecessor 
of 28 USCS §2410; if, upon final determination 
of criminal case, fine results as to defendant, 
government may perfect its lien to enforce crimi-
nal fine as in civil judgment. Bank of Hawaii v 
Benchwick (1966, DC Hawaii) 249 F Supp 74. 
28 USCS § 2410, permitting United States to 
assert its interest in state proceeding, speaks only 
to lien interest. Isham v Blount (1974, DC Tenn) 
373 F Supp 1376. 
6. Establishment of lien priorities 
Under ordinary circumstances, validity of 
county tax foreclosure proceeding would be gov-
erned by state law, but, where federal lien is 
involved and action is brought under federal 
statute, decision of United States courts must 
govern; thus, court must hold that earlier federal 
tax lien is superior to later county tax lien, 
although state law provides that county tax liens 
are superior to all liens prior in time. United 
States v Howard (1966, DC Or) 254 F Supp 499. 
In action in which jurisdiction is predicated on 
28 USCS §2410, federal rule for determining 
relative priority between federal lien and state-
created lien is "first in time, first in right." 
Kimbeil Foods, Inc. v Republic Nat. Bank 
(1975, DC Tex) 401 F Supp 316. 
7. Application of state law 
Law of state where property is situated con-
trols question whether United States, after hav-
ing been joined under former 28 USCS § 2410 in 
action brought in state court for foreclosure of 
property on which United States claims junior 
mortgage, is entitled to payment of its claims in 
full upon redemption by mortgagor or only to 
such debts as have been declared liens by state 
courts. United States v John Hancock Mut. Life 
Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 301, 5 L Ed 2d 1, 81 S 
a i. 
8. Administrative waiver of liens [28 USCS 
§ 2410(e)] 
28 USCS § 2410(e) waives United States privi-
leges concerning actions affecting property on 
which United States has lien. United States v 
Deya (1974, DC Puerto Rico) 369 F Supp 1113. 
H. APPLICATION TO PARTICULAR 
ACTIONS 
A. Actions to Quiet Tide [28 USCS 
§ 2410UXD] 
9. Generally 
Jurisdiction conferred by former 28 USCS 
§2410 was not dependent upon relief sought; 
thus, in action to quiet title, it was not necessary 
to seek sale of property in order to vest court 
with jurisdiction over United States. United 
States v Morrison (1957, CA5 Tex) 247 F2d 285. 
Action to quiet title, where delinquent taxpay-
er's state liquor license was levied upon and sold 
under federal tax lien, is not undermined by fact 
that license is personal rather than real property; 
although suits to quiet title traditionally involved 
real property, where action is governed by fed-
eral rather than state law, 28 USCS §2410 
contemplates actions to quiet title to personalty 
on which United States has or claims hen. Aqua 
Bar & Lounge, Inc. v United States Dept. of 
Treasury Internal Revenue Service (1976, CA3) 
539 F2d 935. 
In context of 28 USCS § 2410, words "quiet 
title" are not used in limited sense. Law v 
United States Dept. of Agriculture (1973, DC 
Ga) 366 F Supp 1233. 
10. When action will not lie 
Where United States claimed title to property 
rather than mortgage or other lien interest 
therein, 28 USCS § 2410 did not authorize suit 
against United States in quiet title action. Ber-
tie's Apple Valley Farms v United States (1973, 
CA9 Idaho) 476 F2d 291. 
Proceeding to enforce attorney's lien for fee 
was not proceeding to quiet title or for foreclo-
sure of mortgage or other lien upon real or 
personal property within contemplation of for-
mer 28 USCS §2410. Lavenburg v Universal 
Sportswear, Inc. (1950, DC NY) 92 F Supp 473. 
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not waive immu-
nity of United States in action to quiet title 
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where record title is vested in United States. 
Hull v Tollefson (1956, DC ND) 138 F Supp 
315. 
Action seeking to restrain government from 
collecting penalties for violation of wheat quota 
is not action to quiet title to wheat, even though 
government has asserted lien on wheat, and 
former 28 USCS § 2410 does not confer govern-
ment's consent to be sued in such action. Shina-
berry v United States (1956, DC Mich) 142 F 
Supp 413, affd (CA6 Mich) 242 F2d 758, cert 
den 353 US 976, 1 L Ed 2d 1137, 77 S Ct 1060. 
Action for "general determination'* of water 
rights under state law, in which governmental 
agencies of United States were named as claim-
ants to water involved, was not type of proceed-
ing which was within original jurisdiction of 
District Court under former 28 USCS § 2410(a), 
even though proceeding partook of nature of suit 
to quiet title. Re Green River Drainage Area 
(1956, DC Utah) 147 F Supp 127. 
Suit characterized as one for injunctive relief, 
can nevertheless be in nature of suit to quiet 
title, and thus, be maintained under 28 USCS 
§2410; however, United States could not be 
made party to action under 28 USCS 
§2410(aXl) or (2), where interest of United 
States in insuring a low income housing project 
could not be classified as "lien" within 28 USCS 
§ 2410(aX2) and thus not removable under 28 
USCS § 1440. Haggard v Lancaster (1970, DC 
Miss) 320 F Supp 1252. 
11. Judgment liens 
Surviving children of intestate judgment debt-
ors may maintain action under 28 USCS § 2410 
against United States, judgment creditor, to quiet 
title to real property held by parents, where 
United States allowed judgment lien to become 
dormant under state law, by failing to cause 
execution to issue within time provided therefor; 
judgment in favor of United States does not 
create such "interest" in real property as to 
preclude action against it under 28 USCS § 2410, 
as interest resulting from judgment is lien. Mat-
thews v Heirs, Exrs., Admrs., Devisees, Trustees 
& Assigns of Matthews (1974, DC Okla) 378 F 
Supp 693. 
12. Tax liens 
Federal District Court, as jurisdictional prere-
quisite in suit to quiet title from federal tax lien, 
need not order foreclosure. United States v Mor-
rison (1957, CA5 Tex) 247 F2d 285. 
State court had jurisdiction of action against 
United States to quiet title to land conveyed to 
plaintiff wife by taxpayer husband some 2 years 
prior to filing of collector's notice of tax lien 
against husband; and provisions of Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1939, requiring consent of Com-
missioner or federal District Court as condition 
precedent to maintaining quiet title action 
against claimed tax lien of United States, was 
not applicable. Smith v United States (1958, 
CA6 Ohio) 254 F2d 865. 
Words "quiet title" used in former 28 USCS 
§ 2410(a), included suit to remove cloud on 
plaintiff's title arising because of tax lien claimed 
by government. United States v Coson (1961, 
CA9 Cal) 286 F2d 453. 
Action to quiet title under 28 USCS § 2410 is 
proper proceeding to be brought by delinquent 
taxpayer, whose state liquor license has been 
levied upon and sold under federal tax lien. 
Aqua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v United States Dept. 
of Treasury Internal Revenue Service (1976, 
CA3) 539 F2d 935. 
Although labeled "Petition to Quiet Title", 
complaint which, in effect, merely sought to 
enjoin United States from collecting taxes (com-
plaint deviating from procedures set forth by 
Congress with respect to refund of taxes), was 
not action within contemplation of former 28 
USCS §2410. Viviano v United States (1952, 
DC Mich) 105 F Supp 312. 
Suit brought by husband and wife to quiet title 
to properties owned by them as estates by entire-
ties, upon which government asserted tax lien, 
was subject to provisions of former 28 USCS 
§2410. Bernstein v United States (1952, DC 
Mo) 106 F Supp 233. 
Purchasers of real property who overlooked 
federal tax liens duly filed for record, but instead 
relied upon grantor's affidavit that property was 
free of liens, could not maintain action to quiet 
title against United States. Pipola v Chicco 
(1959, DC NY) 169 F Supp 229, mod on other 
grounds (CA2 NY) 274 F2d 909 (ovrld on other 
grounds United States v O'Connor (CA2 NY) 
291 F2d 520, 100 ALR2d 858). 
Federal District Court had jurisdiction of ac-
tion by beneficiary praying that court order and 
direct insurance company pay specified sum of 
money and interest from date obligation accrued 
in favor of plaintiff and to quiet title to proceeds 
of life insurance policy as against alleged liens of 
United States and District Director of Internal 
Revenue. Guttman v United States (1961, DC 
NY) 196 F Supp 384. 
13. Defective title 
Plaintiff in action against United States to 
quiet title could not prevail under 28 USCS 
§ 2410 where land in question was never con-
veyed to plaintiffs predecessor in interest. Gen-
dron v United States (1974, DC Cal) 402 F Supp 
46, affd (CA9 Cal) 524 F2d 1154. 
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B. Actions to Foreclose Mortgage or Other Lien 
[28 USCS § 241(KaX2)] 
14. When action will lie 
Action under predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 
to foreclose mortgage on realty which had been 
acquired by Federal Housing Administrator 
upon default of insured FHA loan secured by 
mortgage on property could be maintained, as 
against contention that property was really 
owned by United States and hence not subject to 
execution or suit. Riordan v Ferguson (1945, 
CA2 NY) 147 F2d 983. 
Proceeding to enforce attorney's lien for fee 
was not proceeding to quiet title or for foreclo-
sure of mortgage or other lien upon real or 
personal property within contemplation of for-
mer 28 USCS §2410. Lavenburg v Universal 
Sportswear, Inc. (1950, DC NY) 92 F Supp 473. 
15. Effect of junior federal lien 
In absence of congressional determination to 
contrary, junior federal tax lien on mortgaged 
property is effectively extinguished by private or 
judicial sale of property in state proceedings to 
which United States was not, and was not re-
quired to be, party, where under state law such 
sale has effect of extinguishing junior liens even 
though their holders were not, nor required to be 
made, parties to proceedings. United States v 
Brosnan (1960) 363 US 237, 4 L Ed 2d 1192, 80 
SCt 1108. 
First sentence of former 28 USCS § 2410(c), 
providing that judicial sale in action involving 
property to which United States claims lien shall 
have same effect respecting discharge of property 
from liens held by United States as may be 
provided by local law of place where property is 
situated, is qualified by propositions following 
first sentence, among them redemption privilege 
of United States; only way in which United 
States, in its capacity as junior lienor, can be 
joined in foreclosure proceedings was pursuant 
to terms of former 28 USCS § 2410, since United 
States has not otherwise waived sovereign immu-
nity in this type of situation. United States v 
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 
301, 5 L Ed 2d 1, 81 S Ct 1. 
Second mortgage lien held by United States 
may be extinguished upon foreclosure of prior 
lien in accordance with Pennsylvania practice, 
whereby foreclosure of prior mortgage divests all 
subsequent liens on real estate and joinder of 
subordinate lienors in action is not necessary and 
it is not necessary to give them actual notice; 
and former 28 USCS § 2410 was not intended to 
require joinder of United States, but was merely 
waiver of sovereign immunity by consent to be 
sued in those situations where foreclosing credi-
tor might be required to join United States as 
junior lienor under local law. United States v 
Cless (1958, CA3 Pa) 254 F2d 590. 
Subordinate tax hens of United States were 
divested upon foreclosure of purchase money 
mortgage. American Casualty Co. v Southern 
Materials Co. (1958, CA4 Va) 261 F2d 197. 
Action may be brought against United States 
by secured creditor under 28 USCS § 2410, to 
assert its senior lien against property upon which 
junior federal lien has been foreclosed. North-
west Equipment Sales Co. v Western Packers, 
Inc. (1976, CA9 Idaho) 543 F2d 65. 
United States was not necessary party in pro-
ceedings for foreclosure of mortgage where mort-
gagor was in default of payments and United 
States had tax lien on property junior to mort-
gage, and mortgagee for consideration paid, se-
cured release of all claims of United States under 
tax lien. McNally v Currigan (1956) 134 Colo 
188, 301 P2d 136. 
Federal tax liens filed after recording of mort-
gage, institution of suit to foreclose and filing of 
lis pendens, were discharged so far as mortgaged 
property was concerned. Puritan Dairy Products 
Co. v Christoffers (1959) 54 NJ Super 102, 148 
A2d 223. 
16. Foreclosure sale 
No decree of foreclosure could be made under 
predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410(c), unless it 
provided for sale of mortgaged property. Integ-
rity Trust Co. v United States (1933, DC NJ) 3 
F Supp 577. 
Provisions of predecessor of 28 USCS 
§ 2410(a) giving consent of United States to be 
named party in any suit to foreclose mortgage or 
other lien on realty, permitted relief only by sale 
of property subject to lien. Ford Bros. & Co. v 
Eddington Distilling Co. (1939, DC Pa) 30 F 
Supp 213. 
Where trial court granted defendant's motion 
for strict foreclosure of mortgage on real estate 
against which United States asserted tax lien, 
jurisdiction over United States was lost, and, in 
view of 28 USCS § 2410(c), that United States 
shall be party in foreclosure proceeding only 
where foreclosure by sale is sought, judgment of 
strict foreclosure which purported to vest abso-
lute title in redeeming incumbrancer was not 
binding on United States. City Sav. Bank v 
Lawler (1972) 163 Conn 149, 302 A2d 252. 
17. Redemption, generally [28 USCS § 2410(c)] 
United States, as second mortgagee of real 
estate judicially foreclosed in proceeding to 
which United States was made party under 
former 28 USCS § 2410, was entitled to redeem, 
within 1 year from date of sale pursuant to 
former 28 USCS § 2410(c), despite conflicting 
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state statute giving mortgagor exclusive right to 
redeem within that period; inconsistent provi-
sions of state law must fall under supremacy 
clause of USCS Constitution, Art VI; redemp-
tion privilege of United States under former 28 
USCS § 2410(c) was not affected by fact that 
federal agency concerned is authorized by an-
other federal statute to bid at foreclosure sale, at 
least where authority of agency is not limited to 
so bidding. United States v John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 301, 5 L Ed 2d 1, 
81 S Ct 1. 
Provisions of 28 USCS § 2410(d) are not un-
constitutional, as denying due process of law, for 
failure to require hearing before government may 
exercise its right of redemption under 28 USCS 
§2410; in case of any real dispute involving 
exercise of right of redemption, persons affected 
by government's action may maintain suit under 
§2410 to protect their interests. Equity Mortg. 
Corp. v Loftus (1974, CA4 Va) 504 F2d 1071. 
Where value of property at time of mortgage 
foreclosure by bank was less than indebtedness 
and bank agreed to sell property to third person, 
court, in action by bank to quiet title against 
subsequent tax lien of United States, ordered 
such hen canceled of record where United States 
had not redeemed property within 1 year, as 
provided by former 28 USCS §2410. Miners 
Sav. Bank v United States (1953, DC Pa) 110 F 
Supp 563. 
28 USCS § 2410(c), giving government right of 
redemption, affects only title to mortgaged prem-
ises for one year after foreclosure sale, and 
cannot be invoked by tenant seeking to continue 
tenancy during that period. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. v Rochester Area Council of Churches 
Development, Inc. (1973) 76 Misc 2d 839, 351 
NYS2d 782, affd without opinion 43 App Div 2d 
905, 352 NYS2d 598. 
18. —Payment [28 USCS § 2410(d)] 
In order to redeem from sale under duly 
recorded mortgage, United States, as holder of 
junior tax liens, was required under former 28 
USCS § 2410 to tender full amount of mortgage 
debt. United States v Brosnan (1959, CA3 Pa) 
264 F2d 762, affd on other grounds 363 US 237, 
4 L Ed 2d 1192, 80 SCt 1108. 
"The expenses necessarily incurred in connec-
tion with such property** under 28 USCS 
§ 2410(dX3) include redemption expenses to pre-
vent destruction of title, that is, expenses essen-
tial to continued vitality of junior liens. Equity 
Mortg. Corp. v Loftus (1974, CA4 Va) 504 F2d 
1071. 
United States was required, under former 28 
USCS § 2410, in seeking to make redemption 
after sale of property to satisfy senior lien, to 
tender full amount of prior mortgage debt, 
rather than amount bid in by purchaser at 
foreclosure sale; term "redeem'* as used in 28 
USCS § 2410, could not be interpreted to include 
only amount realized at sale, since to do so 
would enable federal government, by offering 
such amount, to assume position of senior lien-
holder, thereby gaining advantage which it could 
not have secured either before or at foreclosure 
sale. First Bank & Trust Co. v MacGarvie 
(1956) 22 NJ 539, 126 A2d 880. 
19. —Credit of lienor's account 
Upon government acquiring title to property 
through redemption procedure provided for by 
28 USCS § 2410(c), mortgagor whose mortgage 
has been foreclosed, is entitled to credit against 
his account by government in amount govern-
ment would have paid at foreclosure sale. Con-
necticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v Carter (1971, CA5 
Ha) 446 F2d 136, cert den 404 US 857, 30 L Ed 
2d 98, 92 S Ct 104 and cert den 404 US 1000, 
30 L Ed 2d 553, 92 S Ct 563. 
C. Interpleader Actions [28 USCS § 2410(a)(5)] 
20. Generally 
When provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410 
were broadened by Federal Tax Lien Act of 
1966, Congress broadened government's consent 
to be sued to include actions in nature of inter-
pleader; in so doing, interpleader actions were 
considered to be those suits brought by persons 
holding property for purpose of determining who 
is entitled to property held, which definition is in 
accord with traditional definition. Johnson Ser-
vice Co. v H.S. Kaiser Co. (1971, DC 111) 324 F 
Supp 745. 
21. When action will lie 
District Court had jurisdiction of United 
States in interpleader suit by 7 insurance compa-
nies wherein Collector of Internal Revenue was 
made party defendant if collector was claiming 
hen on proceeds of fire insurance policies for 
payment of taxes of insured. United States v 
Sentinel Fire Ins. Co. (1949, CA5 Miss) 178 F2d 
217. 
Department of Agriculture, by interpleading 
with soil bank payment in action between vendee 
and vendor of land, did not render itself subject 
to action under 28 USCS § 2410(aX5), as inter-
pleader was not with respect to real or personal 
property on which government claimed mortgage 
or other hen. Wood v Deweese (1969, DC Ky) 
305 F Supp 939. 
In action under predecessor of 28 USCS 
§ 2410 to foreclose trust deed covering real estate 
on which it was alleged federal government 
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claimed tax lien, state court had jurisdiction as 
to United States without request by trustee to 
Collector of Internal Revenue. Douglas Proper-
ties v Stix (1935) 118 Fla 354, 159 So 1. 
United States was proper party, under former 
28 USCS § 2410, to be interpleaded in action by 
supplier of materials against contractor and sub-
contractor to recover for materials supplied to 
subcontractor, since United States had tax liens 
against defendant subcontractor. Lemar Paint 
Products Co. v Dimiceli (1956) 3 Misc 2d 705, 
155 NYS2d 534. 
Action by mortgagee of real property was not 
in "interpleader or in the nature of interpleader" 
within 28 USCS § 2410(aX5) where stakeholder 
was insurer and not mortgagee. South Brooklyn 
Sav. Bank v All State Ins. Co. (1975) 84 Misc 2d 
287, 375 NYS2d 273. 
D. Actions Involving Tax Liens 
22. Generally 
Federal tax liens are wholly creatures of fed-
eral statute, but state law governs divestiture of 
federal tax liens, except to extent that Congress 
may have entered field; neither 26 USCS § 7424, 
dealing with civil actions to clear title to prop-
erty to which federal tax lien has attached, nor 
former 28 USCS §2410, disclosed intent to 
exclude otherwise available state procedures 
which may result in divestiture of federal tax 
lien. United States v Brosnan (1960) 363 US 237, 
4 L Ed 2d 1192, 80 S Ct 1108. 
United States may not be sued under 28 USCS 
§ 2410, where tax lien levy has been released and 
is no longer outstanding. Nickerson v United 
States (1975, CA1 RI) 513 F2d 31. 
23. Attack on validity of lien, generally 
Federal District Court had jurisdiction of ac-
tion to quiet title to specific parcels of real 
property owned by plaintiff brought under for-
mer 28 USCS §2410, against which United 
States claimed lien for unpaid withholding, em-
ployment, and cabaret taxes of partnership in 
which plaintiff was limited partner, and where 
plaintiff contended that there was no lien be-
cause taxes never had been assessed against him. 
Coson v United States (1958, DC Cal) 169 F 
Supp 671, mod (CA9 Cal) 286 F2d 453. 
Federal District Court had jurisdiction of ac-
tion brought under former 28 USCS § 2410 to 
expunge United States tax liens and quiet title to 
real property of plaintiffs, which liens had been 
assessed under jeopardy assessments against 
plaintiffs as transferees. Sonitz v United States 
(1963, DC NJ) 221 F Supp 762. 
Upon determination in favor of taxpayer in 
proceeding to cancel tax assessment, if govern-
ment fails to cancel assessment and issue certifi-
cate of release of lien within reasonable period of 
time after judgment of court becomes final and 
after written request therefor by taxpayer, it 
would be appropriate for taxpayer to institute 
legal proceedings to force such action pursuant 
to 28 USCS § 2410. Kurio v United States (1968, 
DC Tex) 281 F Supp 252. 
28 USCS § 2410(a) did not intend to change 
traditional rule of "pay first and litigate later" as 
it pertains to hens for taxes. Shaw v United 
States (1970, DC Vt) 321 F Supp 1267. 
In ordinary refund suit, taxpayer's failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies would probably 
prevent judicial review; however, such failure is 
not fatal to bringing suit under 28 USCS § 2410 
to challenge validity of jeopardy assessment lien 
and levy procedure; under appropriate circum-
stances, taxpayer may clearly invoke 28 USCS 
§ 2410 as available jurisdictional base upon 
which to specifically challenge validity of partic-
ular government procedures and methods used 
to collect tax assessment from taxpayer; how-
ever, in such action, judicial review is appropri-
ately restricted to examining possible violations 
of taxpayer's constitutional rights alleged to have 
occurred during course of tax collection proceed-
ings. YanniceUi v Nash (1973, DC NJ) 354 F 
Supp 143. 
24. —Determination of title against which lien 
asserted 
Under predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410, United 
States could be made party to action against 
Collector of Internal Revenue in which, in order 
to grant relief sought, it was necessary to ad-
judge whether beneficial title to undivided inter-
est in leases owned by plaintiff corporation ever 
vested in individual taxpayer. Jones v Tower 
Production Co. (1943, CA10 Okla) 138 F2d 675. 
Action brought against Collector of Internal 
Revenue to determine title and interest in funds 
against which collector had issued warrant of 
distraint, was not action to enjoin collection of 
tax as contended by collector, but was action to 
determine right of United States under tax lien 
asserted against fund, and, United States being 
necessary party, had, under predecessor of 28 
USCS §2410, consented to be sued. Adler v 
Nicholas (1948, CA10 Colo) 166 F2d 674. 
Action to quiet title under 28 USCS § 2410(a) 
will lie where delinquent taxpayer sought to 
resolve title to state liquor license levied upon 
and sold by United States under tax hen, so long 
as taxpayer does not seek to attack validity of 
assessment. Aqua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v United 
States Dept. of Treasury Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (1976, CA3) 539 F2d 935. 
Declaratory judgment action by husband and 
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wife brought under former 28 USCS § 2410 for 
declaration that tax lien based on premarriage 
tax lien of husband did not attach to community 
property of husband and wife, could be sus-
tained. Stone v United States (1963, DC Wash) 
225 F Supp 201. 
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not provide vehi-
cle for taxpayer to question validity of tax assess-
ment or lien; thus, where government asserted 
that given individual was taxpayer and levied 
against property of that person, § 2410 could not 
be construed as waiving government's immunity 
in suit to question validity of that lien, even 
where one bringing suit asserted that lien was on 
her property, but she was not taxpayer in ques-
tion. McCann v United States (1965, DC Pa) 
248 F Supp 585. 
25. Attack on validity of assessment 
Federal government, in seeking aid of courts 
in enforcing tax assessment in any form, opens 
assessment to judicial scrutiny in all respects. 
United States v O'Connor (CA2 NY) 291 F2d 
520, 100 ALR2d 858. 
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not give govern-
ment's consent to suit to quiet title by taxpayer 
to test underlying merits of tax assessment, and 
without such consent jurisdiction of court was 
lacking. Broadwell v United States (1965, CA4 
NC) 343 F2d 470, cert den 382 US 825, 15 L Ed 
2d 70, 86 S Ct 57; Baits v United States (1964, 
DC NC) 228 F Supp 272. 
Taxpayer cannot dispute validity of tax assess-
ment under guise of quiet title action, without 
having first paid outstanding assessment; and, 
even suing as marital community, husband and 
wife do not become such third party as is 
authorized to bring suit under 28 USCS § 2410. 
Mulcahy v United States (1968, CA5 Tex) 388 
F2d300. 
Action to quiet title under 28 USCS § 2410(a) 
will lie where delinquent taxpayer sought to 
resolve title to state liquor license levied upon 
and sold by United States under tax lien, so long 
as taxpayer does not seek to attack validity of 
assessment. Aqua Bar & Lounge, Inc. v United 
States Dept. of Treasury Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (1976, CA3) 539 F2d 935. 
Provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410(a) did 
not permit joinder of United States as defendant 
in suit, primary purpose of which suit was to 
ascertain tax liability. Viviano v United States 
(1952, DC Mich) 105 F Supp 312; Commercial 
Credit Corp. v Schwartz (1954, DC Ark) 126 F 
Supp 728; Gordon v Bank of America Nat. 
Trust & Sav. Asso. (1957, DC Cal) 150 F Supp 
772. 
Former 28 USCS §2410 did not constitute 
waiver of sovereign immunity so as to permit 
United States to be joined as party in action to 
quiet title to property by transferee taxpayer 
against whom jeopardy assessments have been 
made and liens filed and to permit taxpayer to 
inquire into merits of underlying assessments in 
determining validity of tax lien. Cooper Agency, 
Inc. v McLeod (1964, DC SC) 235 F Supp 276, 
affd (CA4 SC) 348 F2d 919. 
Former 28 USCS §2410 was intended to 
permit United States to be joined as party in 
limited class of cases; section was not intended 
to grant jurisdiction over suit by taxpayer to 
question amount of taxes due. Seff v Machiz 
(1965, DC Md) 246 F Supp 823. 
Former 28 USCS § 2410 did not provide vehi-
cle for taxpayer to question validity of tax assess-
ment or lien. McCann v United States (1965, 
DC Pa) 248 F Supp 585. 
In actions brought under 28 USCS §2410, 
where tax lien is involved, sovereign immunity is 
waived and subject matter jurisdiction conferred 
on court, provided that plaintiff refrains from 
collaterally attacking merits of government's tax 
assessment itself; thus, where plaintiff questions 
only legality of procedure used to enforce jeop-
ardy assessment, and not validity of jeopardy 
assessment itself, suit falls within jurisdictional 
scope of 28 USCS §2410. Yannicelli v Nash 
(1972, DC NJ) 354 F Supp 143. 
In light of legislative history of 28 USCS 
§ 2410(a), consent of government, given under 
that section, does not extend to taxpayer's attack 
on merits of tax assessment, through vehicle of 
suit to quiet title; taxes are to be collected first, 
challenges to those taxes may then be litigated, 
and 28 USCS § 2410 has very curtailed function 
in that it gives parties other than taxpayer, 
opportunity to litigate limited set of questions 
with regard to government liens on property in 
which they had interest. Globe Products Corp. v 
United States (1974, DC Md) 386 F Supp 319. 
Annotations: 
Right to attack merits of assessment, in pro-
ceeding under 26 USC § 7403 to enforce, or 
under 28 USC § 2410 to discharge, federal tax 
lien. 100 ALR2d 869. 
26. Attack on enforcement of lien 
One against whose property United States 
asserts tax lien, who is not taxpayer and is thus 
precluded from challenging assessment under 28 
USCS § 1346(aXl), may bring action against 
government under 28 USCS § 2410, if govern-
ment attempts to enforce lien by levy. Busse v 
United States (1976, CA7 111) 542 F2d 421. 
District Court had jurisdiction to entertain, 
under former 28 USCS § 2410, action to enjoin 
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government from enforcing tax liens against 
plaintiffs' property, where it was asserted and 
disclosed to satisfaction of court, that liens were 
invalid or were result of arbitrary and capricious 
conduct. Sanders v Andrews (1954, DC Okla) 
121 F Supp 584, revd on other grounds (CA10) 
225 F2d 629, cert den 350 US 967, 100 L Ed 
839, 76 S Ct 435. 
Former 28 USCS §2410 was intended to 
permit United States to be joined as party in 
limited class of cases; section was not intended 
to grant jurisdiction over suit by taxpayer to 
question amount of taxes due or to enjoin en-
forcement of tax lien. Seff v MacHiz (1965, DC 
Md) 246 F Supp 823. 
27. Standing to attack 
One against whose property United States 
asserts tax lien, who is not taxpayer and is thus 
precluded from challenging assessment under 28 
USCS § 1346(aXl), may bring action against 
government under 28 USCS § 2410, if govern-
ment attempts to enforce lien by levy. Busse v 
United States (1976, CA7 111) 542 F2d 421. 
One who was not party to tax claim of United 
States, although having no remedy for relief 
under Internal Revenue Code, had adequate 
remedy under former 28 USCS §2410 to test 
validity of tax lien filed against his real property, 
in any state court having jurisdiction or in any 
federal court in which plaintiff could invoke 
jurisdiction. Petition of Sills (1953, DC NY) 115 
F Supp 239. 
Taxpayer cannot dispute validity of tax assess-
ment under guise of quiet title action, without 
having first paid outstanding assessment; and, 
even suing as marital community, husband and 
wife do not become such third party, as is 
authorized to bring suit under 28 USCS § 2410. 
Mulcahy v United States (1968, CA5 Tex) 388 
F2d300. 
28. Resolution of conflicting tax liens 
Litigation, removed at instance of United 
States from state court to federal court, involving 
contest between city and the United States over 
priority for satisfaction of their respective tax 
claims out of property seized, was cognizable by 
court under provisions of former 28 USCS 
§ 2410(a). New York v Evigo Corp. (1954, DC 
NT) Yl\ F Supp Ito. 
29. Foreclosure of state tax liens 
United States cannot be party to suit to fore-
close tax sales certificates without its consent. 
Kenilworth v Corwine (1951, DC NJ) 96 F Supp 
68. 
30. Subrogation to tax lien 
In action by taxpayer and her second husband 
to recover damages by reason of second hus-
band's satisfaction of joint federal income tax 
liability incurred by taxpayer and her first hus-
band, in which plaintiffs alleged that Internal 
Revenue Service had reneged on agreement that 
plaintiff husband would be subrogated to right of 
IRS against first husband and would acquire 
thereby a tax lien on certain property, court 
lacked jurisdiction under 28 USCS §2410 to 
grant relief in form of determination that plain-
tiff husband's tax lien was superior to rights of 
United States in subject property. Jorrie v Impe-
rial Invest. Co. (1973, DC Tex) 355 F Supp 
1088. 
31. Tax sales 
Taxpayer who alleged that his property was 
advertised and sold, after levy, for payment of 
back income taxes contrary to 26 USCS § 6335, 
has right of action under that section, but has no 
remedy for enforcing it except under 28 USCS 
§ 2410(a), which waives sovereign immunity. 
Little River Farms, Inc. v United States (1971, 
DC Ga) 328 F Supp 476. 
m . PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
32. Jurisdiction of District Court, generally 
Action under predecessor of 28 USCS § 2410 
to quiet title against United States and another 
defendant could not be brought in federal Dis-
trict Court where complaint did not allege diver-
sity of citizenship or disclose any other basis for 
federal jurisdiction. 
Provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410 presup-
posed that federal court in which suit was pend-
ing or brought had jurisdiction thereof on 
grounds independent of such section; § 2410 was 
not, in itself, grant of federal jurisdiction. Seattle 
Asso. of Credit Men v United States (1957, CA9 
Wash) 240 F2d 906; Remis v United States 
(1960, CA1 Mass) 273 F2d 293; Haldeman v 
United States (1950, DC Mich) 93 F Supp 889; 
Tompkins v United States (1959, DC Tex) 172 F 
Supp 204; Schmitz v Societe Internationale 
(1966, DC Dist Col) 249 F Supp 757, cert den 
387 US 908, 18 L Ed 2d 626, 87 S Ct 1684. 
Provisions of former 28 USCS §2410, as 
integral part of Judicial Code, established specific 
jurisdiction for suits contemplated by such sec-
tion, either by direct action or by removal. 
United States v Morrison (1957, CA5 Tex) 247 
F2d285. 
Former 28 USCS §2410 waived sovereign 
immunity, but did not authorize suit unless there 
are jurisdictional grounds independent of that 
section. Remis v United States (1960, CA1 
Mass) 273 F2d 293. 
Provisions of 28 USCS § 2410(aX5) do not 
implicitly abandon diversity requirement in inter-
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pleader proceedings when United States is de-
fendant; 28 USCS § 2410(aX5) presupposes valid 
interpleader action, as such provision, though 
waiving sovereign immunity, does not, in addi-
tion thereto, confer jurisdiction upon federal 
courts. Kent v Northern California Regional 
Office of American Friends Service Committee 
(1974, CA9 Cal) 497 F2d 1325. 
Purpose of former 28 USCS § 2410 was not to 
confer jurisdiction on District Courts to enter-
tain such cases as provided for by such section, 
but rather to waive sovereign immunity of 
United States in such cases where another inde-
pendent ground of jurisdiction already exists. 
Jones v United States (1959, DC Cal) 179 F 
Supp 456. 
28 USCS § 2410 is not jurisdiction-conferring 
statute but is merely legislative act waiving sov-
ereign immunity; hence, if jurisdiction is to exist, 
some other statutory basis must provide it. 
American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v Construc-
ciones Weri, Inc. (1975, DC VI) 407 F Supp 
164. 
33. —Removal 
Upon removal of action from state court, in 
which action United States had been made party 
pursuant to 28 USCS § 2410, and upon determi-
nation of case on its merits by federal trial court, 
on appeal, Court of Appeals can consider only 
whether District Court could have had original 
jurisdiction of parties, and cannot consider 
whether case was properly removed from the 
state court. Grubbs v General Electric Credit 
Corp. (1972) 405 US 699, 31 L Ed 2d 612, 92 S 
Q 1344. 
Upon removal from state court of action 
brought under provisions of predecessor of 28 
USCS § 2410, pursuant to provisions of 28 USCS 
§ 1444, federal court acquired jurisdiction to 
entertain action. Wells v Long (1947, CA9 
Idaho) 162 F2d 842; Vincent v P. R. Matthews 
Co. (1954, DC NY) 126 F Supp 102; First Nat 
Bank v United States (1959, DC Tex) 172 F 
Supp 757. 
United States, by removing case under 28 
USCS § 1444, from state court in which action 
was brought under former 28 USCS § 2410, to 
federal court, invokes jurisdiction of federal 
court and, consequently, federal court has juris-
diction, even though it would not have had 
jurisdiction if action had originally been brought 
in federal court. Hood v United States (1958, 
CA9 Wash) 256 F2d 522. 
Where plaintiffs brought action in state court 
under former 28 USCS § 2410 to quiet title to 
lands upon which United States claimed recla-
mation project liens, and United States removed 
to federal District Court, latter had jurisdiction 
of action though no hen claim upon any of 
several parcels of land amounted to jurisdictional 
amount. Hood v United States (1958, CA9 
Wash) 256 F2d 522. 
Where plaintiff filed action to enforce hen 
under state law in which United States was party 
to proceeding, United States had no right of 
removal through former 28 USCS § 2410, since 
action was not to quiet title or to foreclose 
mortgage or other hen upon real or personal 
property. Lavenburg v Universal Sportwear, Inc. 
(1950, DC NY) 92 F Supp 473. 
United States was indispensable party to pro-
ceeding involving priority between city and fed-
eral tax hens, in which District Director of 
Internal Revenue was served with order to show 
cause why he should not be restrained from 
enforcing federal hens and such tax should not 
be hens vacated; hence, proceedings were re-
moved to federal District Court. New York v 
Evigo Corp. (1954, DC NY) 121 F Supp 748. 
Waiver of immunity to suit granted by former 
28 USCS §2410 is conditioned upon right of 
removal to federal District Court provided in 28 
USCS § 1444. Vincent v P. R. Matthews Co. 
(1954, DC NY) 126 F Supp 102. 
Removal of proceeding by United States, pur-
suant to 28 USCS § 1444, of state court action 
brought under former 28 USCS § 2410, to ap-
propriate federal court, is not waiver of govern-
ment's objection to jurisdiction of federal court; 
thus, after removal from state court, federal 
court could dismiss action for want of federal 
jurisdiction. Herter v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. (1957, 
DC NY) 149 F Supp 713. 
Although action brought under former 28 
USCS §2410 had been removed from state 
court, federal court had no jurisdiction to enter-
tain such action where court would have had no 
jurisdiction to entertain such action, if it had 
orginally been brought in federal court. George v 
United States (1960, DC Tex) 181 F Supp 522. 
Waiver of immunity of United States to be 
sued in state court under former 28 USCS 
§ 2410 is granted upon condition prescribed in 
28 USCS § 1444, which gave United States un-
qualified option to remove such action to federal 
District Court; therefore, there is no basis upon 
which District Court can remand case to state 
court over objection of United States. Hamlin v 
Hamlin (1964, DC Miss) 237 F Supp 299. 
Interest of Federal Housing Administration as 
insurer of mortgage loan, is not such interest as 
would fall within purview of 28 USCS § 2410(a); 
interest of United States in such situation, al-
though difficult to define with precision, is 
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clearly not "lien" under 28 USCS § 2410, and, 
therefore, such action would not be subject to 
removal under 28 USCS § 1444. Haggard v 
Lancaster (1970, DC Miss) 320 F Supp 1252. 
Jurisdiction of federal court on removal is 
derivative jurisdiction, and if state court lacked 
jurisdiction either of subject matter or of parties, 
federal court acquires none upon removal; thus, 
where action claimed by plaintiff to be in nature 
of interpleader is brought against federal govern-
ment under 28 USCS § 2410, and such action is 
removed to federal court, court can dismiss 
action as to United States where it determines 
that such action is not, in fact, in nature of 
interpleader. Johnson Service Co. v H.S. Kaiser 
Co. (1971, DC 111) 324 F Supp 745. 
Domestic action by husband against wife in 
which United States is made party pursuant to 
28 USCS §2410, may be removed to Federal 
District Court under 28 USCS § 1444, for lim-
ited purposes of determining issues pertaining to 
government's tax lien and its validity and appli-
cation to certain property of parties; federal 
court will not become involved in any of divorce 
or domestic features of case, and, when questions 
pertaining to federal government are determined, 
case will be remanded to state court for further 
determination of domestic features of case; if 
necessary in interim, federal court may remand 
any of domestic features of case which, for some 
reason, may require urgent attention by state 
court. Rostykus v Rostykus (1972, DC Okla) 
352 F Supp 62. 
Where action seeking to impress mechanic's 
lien on certain residential property which was 
subject to deed of trust held by Farmers Home 
Administration was properly within jurisdiction 
of state court under 28 USCS § 2410(a), Federal 
Court had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain 
action upon removal from state court under 28 
USCS § 1444. E. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v 
Hughes (1972, DC Mo) 355 F Supp 1363. 
34. Pleading City Bank of Anchorage v Eagle-
stem (1953, DC Alaska) 110 F Supp 429. 
In order to get case in group of actions to 
which sovereignty is waived by former 28 USCS 
§ 2410, plaintiff has to plead that action is one 
for quieting of title or foreclosure and that 
United States has or claims mortgage or other 
lien on property. Ansonia Nat. Bank v United 
States (1956, DC Conn) 147 F Supp 864. 
35. Joinder 
General rule that United States, by seeking 
affirmative relief in state court, subjects itself to 
all incidents of state law which govern other 
suitors, is not applicable to proceeding which 
was not initiated by United States but by private 
party who joined United States pursuant to 
former 28 USC §2410; and, where state law 
requires joinder of United States as party to 
foreclosure proceedings, § 2410 was mandatorily 
applicable. United States v John Hancock Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. (1960) 364 US 301, 5 L Ed 2d 1, 
81 S Ct 1. 
Under former 28 USCS § 2410, it was proper 
to sue United States alone in state court. George 
v United States (1960, DC Tex) 181 F Supp 522. 
In order to join United States as defendant as 
provided for in former 28 USCS § 2410, private 
lien sought to be foreclosed must have encum-
bered same property that United States' hen 
encumbered; thus, where mechanic's lien encum-
bered parcel of improved real property, and 
United States' lien encumbered debt allegedly 
owed by subcontractor to general contractor, 
action against United States would be dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction as not being within 
waiver of immunity under former § 2410(a). S. & 
E. Bldg. Materials Co. v Joseph P. Day, Inc. 
(1960, DC NY) 188 F Supp 742. 
Provisions of 28 USCS § 2410 are not manda-
tory, and do not require that United States be 
joined as party in proceeding which could have 
been brought under § 2410. Haggard v Lancaster 
(1970, DC Miss) 320 F Supp 1252. 
Where civil litigation involving conflicting 
claims of ownership of property and receivership 
was pending in state court having jurisdiction of 
subject matter, and where certain parties, by 
intervention duly allowed, sought foreclosure of 
mortgages and loan deeds on property on which 
United States claimed lien under jeopardy assess-
ments issued by collector for unpaid income 
taxes, United States may be made party thereto 
under provisions of former 28 USCS § 2410. 
United States v Bullard (1952) 209 Ga 426, 73 
SE2d 179. 
36. Stay of proceedings 
Where plaintiff wife brought action in state 
court against United States to quiet title to land 
conveyed to her by her husband, against claimed 
tax lien against husband, which action United 
States did not remove to federal District Court, 
but later brought action against both husband 
and wife in latter court to foreclose tax lien, 
District Court, in first instance, properly stayed 
further proceedings in that court pending deter-
mination of prior stale court action. Smith v 
United States (1958, CA6 Ohio) 254 F2d 865. 
37. Effect of judgment 
Action by Internal Revenue Service to set 
aside transfer of certain real property as fraudu-
lent against government and to impress and 
foreclose equitable lien on property was barred 
by earlier state court quiet title action under 
principles of res judicata. United States v Perry 
(1973, CA5 Ala) 473 F2d 643. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at place of abode," or similar terms referring to 
Law § 6; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 350 to abode, residence, or domicil, as used in statutes 
362. relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112. 
C.J.S. — 7 CJ.S. Attorney and Client § 15; Key Numbers. — Attorney and Client «=» 
71 CJ.S. Pleading §§ 408, 409, 411, 413. 90; Pleading ** 331 to 338. 
AJLR. — Construction of phrase "usual 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by 
these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the desig-
nated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the 
period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time 
prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sun-
days and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or 
by order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor 
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as ex-
tended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the 
result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any 
action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), 
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of time provided for the 
doing of any act or the taking of any proceeding is not affected or limited by 
the continued existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued exis-
tence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to 
do any act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pending 
before it. 
(d) For motions — Affidavits, A written motion, other than one which 
may be heard ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof shall be served not 
later than 5 days before the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an order may for 
cause shown be made on ex parte application. When a motion is supported by 
affidavit, the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except as other-
wise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later than 1 
day before the hearing, unless the court permits them to be served at some 
other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the 
right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a pre-
scribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the 
notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the 
prescribed period. 
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Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan- Legal holidays enumerated, § 63-13-2. 
tially identical to Rule 6, F.R.C.P. New trial, time of motion for, after judgment 
Rules 73(a) and (g), referred to near the end notwithstanding the verdict, Rule 50(c)(2). 
of Subdivision (b), were deleted, effective Janu- Order defined, Rule 7(b)(2) 
ary 1, 1985. See Rules of the Utah Supreme Pleadings and other papers, service by mail, 
Cross-References.— Amendment to plead- »» , / ~ , ... * .. -., 
i n ^ S , conform to evidence, time of motion for, , £ * • * C o d e ' m a l h n 8 o f n o t l c e o f h e a n n * ' 
1? 1 15(b) 75-1-401. 
Commencement of action, service by mail, Proceedings commenced may continue be-
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Corporation or association, mailing of pro- Reference to master, time of first meeting of 
cess to, Rule 4(e)(4). parties after, Rule 53(d)(1). 
Depositions, objections to errors and irregu- Relief from judgment or order, time for mo-
larities, Rule 32(d). tion, Rule 60. 
Discharge of attachment or release of prop- Rules by district courts, Rule 83. 
erty, Rule 64C(f). Service by mail, Rule 5(b)(1). 
Documents for state or subdivision, filing Substitution of parties, time of motion for, 
date on weekend or holiday, § 63-37-3. £ u j e 25 
Election laws Sundays included in compute-
 S u m m o n 8 m a i l e d „ a l t e r n a t i v e to „„& b y 
tion of tune § 20-1-12. publication, Rule 4(f)(2). 
Failure of term, change of time of holding r „ . ' Y , . „„ „ „ 
court, process does not abate, § 78-7-10. W , how computed § 68-3-7^ 
Failure of term or vacancy in office of judge, Tribunal, board or office exceeding junsdic-
proceeding not affected, § 78-7-21. tlon> noti<*> Rule 65B(e). 
Jury venire, service by mail, § 78-46-13, Undertaking by nonresident plaintiff, timely 
Juvenile Court Act, time computed accord- filing, Rule 12(k). 
ing to Rules of Civil Procedure, § 78-3a-27. When a day appointed is a holiday, § 68-3-8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Additional time after service by mail. 
—Failure to add days. 
Waiver of objection. 
—Industrial commission. 
Computation. 
—Months and years. 
—Sundays. 
Enlargement. 
—Motion for new trial. 
—Notice of appeal. 
Designation of record. 
—Redemption from execution sales. 
Motions and affidavits. 
—Applicability of rule. 
-Court orders. 
New trial. 
—Compliance with rule. 
Actual notice. 
Ineffective notice. 
Time to prepare. 
—Continuance. 
Surprise. 
Cited. 
Additional time after service by mail. ure to add three days to the five-day notice 
-Failure to add days. J**1"* W h e r e n o ^ * £* t W ° ^ P " 1 1 ^ 
' hearings was mailed to him, since he did not 
Waiver of objection. object at the time of either hearing to the no-
Counsel waived his right to object to the fail- tice he received, and he showed no prejudice 
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resulting from the shortened time period. In re 
McCune 717 P.2d 701 (Utah 1986). 
—Industrial commission. 
Subdivision (e) is not inconsistent nor clearly 
inapplicable with the procedure of the Indus-
trial Commission and therefore supplements 
the procedure of the commission. Griffith v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 264,399 P.2d 204 
(1965). 
Computation. 
—Months and years. 
One month is a calendar month, not a lunar 
month of 28 days, nor is it necessarily 30 days. 
Such a month commences at beginning of day 
of month in which period starts and ends at 
expiration of day before same day of next 
month. In re Lynch's Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 
P.2d 454 (1953). 
When the time period is measured in months 
or years from a certain date, the day from 
which the time period is to run is excluded and 
the same calendar date of the final month or 
year is included. Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469 
(Utah 1981). 
—Sundays. 
Notice of appeal was timely filed when the 
last day for filing was a Sunday and the appeal 
notice was filed the following day. Glad v. 
Glad, 567 P.2d 160 (Utah 1977). 
Enlargement. 
—Motion for new trial. 
Defendants' motion for new trial filed more 
than ten days after entry of judgment was not 
timely under Rules 52(b) or 59(b), and under 
this rule trial court may not extend time for 
taking any action under these rules except to 
extent or under conditions stated in them; sub-
sequent untimely appeal from denial of motion 
would be dismissed on plaintiff's motion; after 
original dismissal of appeal neither district 
court nor Supreme Court had jurisdiction to 
reinstate it. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 
120, 466 P.2d 843 (1970). 
—Notice of appeal. 
Neither this rule nor Rule 60(b)(1) applies 
where notice of appeal has not been filed in 
time. Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 
282 P.2d 845 (1955). 
Designation of record. 
Attorney who files notice of appeal is 
charged with knowledge of ten-day period 
within which to file designation of record on 
appeal; he may file for extension of time under 
this rule but may not, in the alternative, later 
claim excusable neglect. Nunley v. Stan Katz 
Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 
(1964). 
—Redemption from execution sales. 
A court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate 
instances extend the period for redemption 
from sales on execution. Mollerup v. Storage 
Sys. Intl, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). 
Motions and affidavits. 
—Applicability of rule. 
Court orders. 
The five-day notice of hearing provision of 
Subdivision (d) does not apply to orders made 
by a court, such as a show cause order. Bott v. 
Bott, 20 Utah 2d 329, 437 P.2d 684 (1968). 
New trial. 
Provision that notice of hearing on motion be 
served not later than five days before the time 
specified for the hearing does not apply to mo-
tion for new trial and such notice is not inte-
gral part of motion for new trial; rule does not 
change procedure whereby a motion can be 
called up at any time parties desire to do so. 
Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 
275 (1960). 
—Compliance with rule. 
Actual notice. 
The trial court may dispense with technical 
compliance with the five-day notice provision 
of Subdivision (d) if there is satisfactory proof 
that a party had actual notice and time to pre-
pare to meet the questions raised by the mo-
tion. Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 
P.2d 236 (1974). 
Ineffective notice. 
Eight days' notice of trial was ineffective to 
give five days' notice when notice was by mail, 
since Saturday, Sunday, and three days for 
mailing were to be deducted from eight-day pe-
riod. Mickelson v. Shelley, 542 P.2d 740 (Utah 
1975). 
Time to prepare. 
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day no-
tice of hearing to release property subject to 
writ of attachment where he had adequate 
time to prepare for hearing and defendant was 
required to post cashier's check in lieu of secu-
rity. Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 
P.2d 236 (1974). 
—Continuance. 
Surprise. 
Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for 
continuance five days before date set for hear-
ing nor failure to file affidavits accompanying 
motion justified denial of motion where plain-
tiffs counsel did not learn of reason for plain-
tiffs inability to appear at hearing in time to 
make motion five days before hearing and Rule 
40(b) does not expressly require affidavits to 
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 48; 
56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders 
§ 10; 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice §§ 26 to 30; 62 
Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 33, 34, 65. 
C-J.S. — 21 CJ.S. Courts § 153; 60 CJ.S. 
Motions and Orders § 8; 66 CJ.S. Notice § 18; 
71 CJ.S. Pleading §§ 98, 114, 219; 72 CJ.S. 
process §§ 33, 51. 
A.L.R. — Vacating judgment or granting 
new trial in civil case, consent as ground of 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
Medical expense, when incurred under policy 
providing for payment of expenses incurred 
within fixed period of time from date of injury, 
10 A.L.R.3d 468. 
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to 
timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674. 
What circumstances excuse failure to submit 
will for probate within time limit set by stat-
ute, 17 A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Construction and effect of contractual or 
statutory provisions fixing time within which 
arbitration award must be made, 56 A.L.R.3d 
815. 
Extension of time within which spouse may 
elect to accept or renounce will, 59 A.L.R.3d 
767. 
Validity of service of summons or complaint 
on Sunday or holiday, 63 A.L.R.3d 423. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Consequences of prosecution's failure to file 
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L.R.4th 
213. 
What constitutes bringing an action to trial 
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid dis-
missal under state statute or court rule requir-
ing such activity within stated time, 32 
A.L.R.4th 840. 
Proper date for valuation of property being 
distributed pursuant to divorce, 34 A.LJt.4th 
63. 
Key Numbers. — Courts «» 68; Motions ** 
10; Notice *=» 10, 11; Pleading «» 85, 199; Pro-
cess «=» 63, 82. 
PART III. 
PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS. 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; form of motions. 
(a) Pleadings, There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer 
contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an 
original party is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party 
answer, if a third-party complaint is served. No other pleading shall be al-
lowed, except that the court may order a reply to an answer or a third-party 
answer. 
(b) Motions, orders and other papers. 
(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, 
shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the 
relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion 
is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion. 
(2) Orders. An order includes every direction of the court including a 
minute order made and entered in writing and not included in a judg-
21 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 69 
ingt land. Brunswick Realty Co. v. Univer- by bringing or depositing the money into court, 
PSfJn*- Co" ^ Utah 75, 134 P* 608 (1913)' yet a P l a i n t i f f could waive tniB ri*ht> and ordi" 
' W ^ *^ title narily, where he failed to bring to trial court's 
^&^Lr tender statute referred to an action attention the fact that money was not produced 
^iSTrecovery of money only, and tender was i n <*>**% he did waive his right in that regard; 
JSt necessary for award of costs in action to more especially was that true where tender-
J^^tift*' Pari**0 B°n<* * M t8- Co. v. Beaver was by check and money to meet same was at 
'^JKmtr 97 Utah 62, 89 P.2d 476 (1939). all times in bank on which drawn. Hirsh v. 
^&#W'
 d e f e c t a # Ogden Furn. & Carpet Co., 48 Utah 434,160 P. 
^2hite6ord\narily tender had to be kept good 2 8 3 ( 1 9 1 6 ) ' 
^
 f 4 COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
'•P^jfi*,Jur# **"~" 20 Am*Jur*2d Co8t8 §§ ^ C,J,a "~ 20 C•J*S' Co8te § 76 et 8eq* 
^ A " Key Numbers. — Costs «=» 42. 
]^Rule 69. Execution and proceedings supplemental there-
*'•• t o . 
(a) Issuance of writ of execution. Process to enforce a judgment shall be 
vfcy ft ^ ^ °^ e x e c u t i ° n unless the court otherwise directs, which may issue at 
gny time within eight years after the entry of judgment, (except an execution 
:i may be stayed pursuant to Rule 62) either in the county in which such judg-
ement was rendered, or in any county in which a transcript thereof has been 
* filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Notwithstand-
i n g the death of a party after judgment execution thereon may be issued, or 
#fuch judgment may be enforced, as follows: 
"fffrf (1) *n c a s e °f the death of the judgment creditor, upon the application of 
**£.i», his executor or administrator, or successor in interest. 
*!(#-' (2) In case of the death of the judgment debtor, if the judgment is for 
;\>: the recovery of real or personal property or the enforcement of a lien 
'^> thereon. 
-Jlltt (b) Contents of writ and to whom it may be directed. The writ of execu-
*i tion must be issued in the name of the state of Utah, sealed with the seal of 
litte court and subscribed by the clerk. It may be issued to the sheriff of any 
**& county in the state (and may be issued at the same time to different counties) 
\ bttt where it requires the delivery of possession or sale of real property, it 
^must be issued to the sheriff of the county where the property or some part 
of is situated. If it requires delivery of possession or sale of personal 
it may be issued to a constable. It must intelligibly refer to the 
_ aent, stating the court, the county where the same is entered or docketed, 
names of the parties, the judgment, and, if it is for money, the amount 
^._ reof, and the amount actually due thereon. It shall be directed to the 
pNheriff of the county in which it is to be executed in cases involving real 
f^^ iroperty, and shall require the officer to proceed in accordance with the terms 
§f|tf the writ; provided that if such writ is against the property of the judgment 
||6to>tor generally it may direct the constable to satisfy the judgment, with 
Iptaterest, out of the personal property of the debtor, and if sufficient personal 
^ptoperty cannot be found, then the sheriff shall satisfy the judgment, with 
^teterest, out of his real property. 
'J&'V the judgment requires the sale of property, the writ of execution shall 
S&tRdte such judgment, or the material parts thereof, and direct the officer to 
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execute the judgment by making the sale and applying the proceeds in i 
mity therewith. The judgment creditor may require a certified copy of «SS 
judgment to be served with the execution upon the party against whom Ji 
judgment was rendered, or upon the person or officer required thereby orlwf 
law to obey the same, and obedience thereto may be enforced by the cotii-il 
(c) When writ to be returned. The writ of execution shall be made r e t u ^ ^ 
able at any time within two months after its receipt by the officer. It shall bfcll 
returned to the court from which it issued, and when it is returned the cle 
must attach it to the record. AT-** 
(d) Service of the w r i t Unless the execution otherwise directs, the of 
must execute the writ against the property of the judgment debtor by leM 
on a sufficient amount of property, if there is sufficient [property]; collectbtj^ 
or selling the choses in action and selling the other property, and payiiigfiS 
the judgment creditor or his attorney so much of the proceeds as will s a t i n l 
the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and a c c r u a l ! 
costs must be returned to the judgment debtor, unless otherwise directedS^l 
the judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judg||l 
ment debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing c o ^ S 
within view of the officer, he must levy only on such part of the property a|*| 
the judgment debtor may indicate, if the property indicated is amply suf f ic ing 
to satisfy the judgment and costs. *MH 
When an officer has begun to serve an execution issued out of any court o j s 
or before the return day of such execution he may complete the service and 
return thereof after such return day. If he shall have begun to serve an execu- 1 
tion, and shall die or be incapable of completing the service and return 
thereof, the same may be completed by any other officer who might by law 1 
execute the same if delivered to him; and if the first officer shall not have 
made a certificate of his doings, the second officer shall certify whatever he 
shall find to have been done by the first, and shall add thereto a certificate of * 
his own doings in completing the service. *| | 
(e) Proceedings on sale of property. « *M 
(1) Notice. Before the sale of the property on execution notice thereof 
must be given as follows: (1) in case of perishable property, by posting 
written notice of the time and place of sale in three public places of the 
precinct or city where the sale is to take place, for such a time as may be 
reasonable, considering the character and condition of the property; (2}ia 
case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in at least 
three public places of the precinct or city where the sale is to take place, 
for not less than 7 nor more than 14 days; (3) in case of real property^ by 
posting a similar notice, particularly describing the property, for 21 days, 
on the property to be sold, at the place of sale, and also in at least 3 public 
places of the precinct or city where the property to be sold is situated, and 
publishing a copy thereof at least 3 times, once a week for 3 successive 
weeks immediately preceding the sale, in some newspaper published in 
the county, if there is one. o *< 
(2) Postponement. If at the time appointed for the sale of any realor 
personal property on execution the officer shall deem it expedient and for 
the interest of all persons concerned to postpone the sale for want of 
purchasers, or other sufficient cause, he may postpone the same from time 
to time, until the same shall be completed; and in every such case he shall 
make public declaration thereof at the time and place previously ap« 
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nointed for the sale, and if such postponement is for a longer time than 
f'oD0 AW* n°ti°e thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original 
^notice of such sale is required to be given. 
(3) Conduct of sale* All sales of property under execution must be 
^fniade at auction to the highest bidder, between the hours of 9 o'clock a.m. 
®* and 5 o'clock p.m. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the 
e^xecution no more shall be sold. Neither the officer holding the execution 
f*nor his deputy shall become a purchaser, or be interested in any purchase 
| f at such sale. When the sale is of personal property capable of manual 
delivery it must be within view of those who attend the sale, and it must 
^be sold in such parcels as are likely to bring the highest price; and when 
^ the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels, 
!f> they must be sold separately; or when a portion of such real property is 
% claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold separately, such 
^portion must be thus sold. All sales of real property must be made at the 
I courthouse of the county in which the property, or some part thereof, is 
^ situated. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the 
f£ order in which the property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such 
property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can 
, be sold to advantage separately, and the officer must follow such direc-
. tions. 
\ (4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be deemed an irrevo-
"^cable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by him for 
#*e property struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may 
again sell the property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is 
r occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition to being liable 
t on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court and may be punished accord-
rt ingly- When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also, in his discre-
tion, thereafter reject any other bid of such person. 
J*. (5) Personal property. When the purchaser of any personal property 
I pays the purchase money, the officer making the sale shall deliver the 
>,< property to the purchaser (if such property is capable of manual delivery) 
} and shall execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale and payment. 
Such certificate shall state that ail right, title and interest which the 
t j ; debtor had in and to such property on the day the execution or attach-
ment was levied, and any right, title and interest since acquired, is trans-
; ferred to the purchaser. 
Qi (6) Real property. Upon a sale of real property the officer shall give to 
^ the purchaser a certificate of sale, containing: (Da particular description 
f of the real property sold; (2) the price paid by him for each lot or parcel if 
sold separately; (3) the whole price paid; (4) a statement to the effect that 
all right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor in and to the 
property is conveyed to the purchaser; provided that where such sale is 
i subject to redemption that fact shall be stated also. A duplicate of such 
t certificate shall be filed for record by the officer in the office of the re-
corder of the county. The real property sold shall be subject to redemption, 
except where the estate sold is less than a leasehold of a two-years' unex-
: pired term, in which event said sale is absolute, 
(f) Redemption from sale. 
(1) Who may redeem. Property sold subject to redemption, or any part 
sold separately, may be redeemed by the following persons or their suc-
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cessors in interest: (1) the judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a lieuSP 
judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some share or n«Sl 
thereof, subsequent to that on which the property was sold. * ;$3||j 
(2) Redemption; how made* At the time of redemption the peraSl 
seeking the same may make payment of the amount required to t i l l 
person firom whom the property is being redeemed, or for him to tyf 
officer who made the sale, or his successor in office. At the same time t y l 
redemptioner must produce to the officer or person from whom he seeks^l 
redeem, and serve with his notice to the officer: (1) a certified copy of fra? 
docket of the judgment under which he claims the right to redeem, Qrtlg! 
he redeems upon a mortgage or other lien, a memorandum of the record^ 
thereof certified by the recorder; (2) an assignment, properly acknoitf^ 
edged or proved where the same is necessary to establish his claim; (3) ^Li 
affidavit by himself or his agent showing the amount then actually dueec 
the lien. .r:i^ 
(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The property may ^ 
redeemed from the purchaser within six months after the sale on paying 
the amount of his purchase with 6 percent thereon in addition, together 
with the amount of any assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum ft* 
fire insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any im» 
provements upon the property which the purchaser may have paij 
thereon after the purchase, with interest on such amounts, and, if th$ 
purchaser is also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the person 
seeking redemption, other than the judgment under which said purchase 
was made, the amount of such lien, with interest. 
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether any sum demanded 
for redemption is reasonable or proper, the person seeking redemption 
may pay the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in die-
pute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was 
issued, and at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth the 
item or items demanded to which he objects, together with his grounds of 
objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order fixing a time fear 
hearing of such objections. A copy of the petition and order fixing time for 
hearing shall be served on the purchaser not less than two days before the 
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court shall enter an 
order determining the amount required for redemption. In the event an 
additional amount to that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the 
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount 
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and deliver a proper 
certificate of redemption upon being paid the amount required by the 
court for redemption. 
(4) Subsequent redemptions. If the property is redeemed by a credi-
tor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may, within 60 days 
after the last redemption and within six months after the sale, redeem the 
property from such last redemptioner in the same manner as provided in 
the preceding subdivision, upon paying the sum of such last redemption, 
with three percent thereon in addition and the amount of any assessment 
or tax, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance and necessary mainte: 
nance, upkeep or repair of any improvements upon the property which 
the last redemptioner may have paid thereon, with interest on such 
amount, and, in addition, the amount of any lien held by such last re-
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4emptioner prior to his own, with interest. Written notice of any redemp-
tion shall be given to the officer and a duplicate filed with the recorder of 
the county. Similar notice shall be given of any taxes or assessments or 
any sums for fire insurance, and necessary maintenance, upkeep or repair 
of any improvements upon the property, paid by the person redeeming, or 
the amount of any lien acquired, other than upon which the redemption 
^as made. Failure to file such notice shall relieve any subsequent re-
demptioner of the obligation to pay such taxes, assessments, or other 
liens. 
, (5) Where no redemption is made. If no redemption is made within 
gix months after the sale, the purchaser or his assignee is entitled to a 
conveyance; or if so redeemed, whenever sixty days have elapsed and no 
other redemption by a creditor has been made and notice thereof has been 
given, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to a sheriff's deed 
a t the expiration of six months after the sale. If the judgment debtor 
redeems, he must make the same payments as are required to effect a 
redemption by a creditor. If the debtor redeems, the effect of the sale is 
terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon a redemption by the 
debtor, the person to whom the payment is made must execute and de-
liver to him a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged. Such certifi-
cate must be filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder where 
the property is situated. 
(6) Rents during period of redemption. The purchaser from the 
time of sale until a redemption, and a redemptioner from the time of his 
redemption until another redemption, is entitled to receive from the ten-
ant in possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the use and 
occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits have been received by 
the judgment creditor or purchaser, or his or their assigns, from the prop-
erty thus sold preceding such redemption, the amounts of such rents and 
profits shall be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the 
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the time al-
lowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such purchaser or credi-
tor, or his assigns, a written and verified statement of the amounts of 
such rents and profits thus received, the period for redemption is ex-
tended five days after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or 
his assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or his as-
signs shall for a period of one month from and after such demand, fail or 
refuse to give such statement, such redemptioner or debtor may, within 
sixty days after such demand, bring an action to compel an accounting 
and disclosure of such rents and profits, and until fifteen days from and 
after the final determination of such action the right of redemption is 
extended to such redemptioner or debtor, 
(g) Remedies of purchaser. 
(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, 
the court may restrain the commission of waste on the property, upon 
motion, with or without notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in inter-
est. But it is not waste for the person in possession of the property at the 
time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards, during the period al-
lowed for redemption, to continue to use it in the same manner in which it 
was previously used, or to use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to 
make the necessary repairs or buildings thereon or to use wood or timber 
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on the property therefor, or for the repair of fences, or for fuel for hj^ 
family while he occupies the property. After his estate has become absod 
lute, the purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action to: 
recover damages for injury to the property by the tenant in possession 
after sale and before possession is delivered under the conveyance. 
(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of property or fc 
dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom. Where, because of irregifc: 
larities in the proceedings concerning the sale, or because the property 
sold was not subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or 
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on execution, b# 
his successor in interest, fails to obtain the property or is dispossessed: 
thereof or evicted therefrom, the court having jurisdiction thereof shallj 
on motion of such party and after such notice to the judgment creditor a& 
the court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment creditor 
for the price paid by the purchaser, together with interest. In the alterna-
tive, if such purchaser or his successor in interest, fails to recover posses^ 
sion of any property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom ins 
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, 6* 
because the property sold was not subject to execution and sale, the court 
having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such party and after such 
notice to the judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the 
original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the amount paid by 
such purchaser at the sale, with interest thereon from the time of pay* 
ment at the same rate that the original judgment bore; and the judgment 
so revived shall have the same force and effect as would an original 
judgment of the date of the revival. 
(h) Contribution and reimbursement; how enforced. When upon an 
execution against several persons more than a pro rata part of the judgment is 
satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the property of one, or one of them 
pays, without a sale, more than his proportion, and the right of contribution 
exists, he may compel such contribution from the others; and where a judg-
ment against several is upon an obligation of one or more as security for the 
others, and the surety has paid the amount or any part thereof, by sale of 
property or otherwise, he may require reimbursement from the principal. This 
person entitled to contribution or reimbursement shall, within one month 
after payment, or sale of his property in the event there is a sale, file in the 
court where the judgment was rendered a notice of such payment and his 
claim for contribution or reimbursement. Upon the filing of such notice the 
clerk must make an entry thereof in the margin of the docket which shall 
have the effect of a judgment against the other judgment debtors to the extent 
of their liability for contribution or reimbursement. 
(i) Payment of judgment by person indebted to judgment debtor. Af-
ter the issuance of an execution and before its return, any person indebted to 
the judgment debtor may pay to the officer the amount of his debt, or so much 
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy the execution, and the officer's receipt is 
a sufficient discharge for the amount paid. 
(j) Where property is claimed by third person. If an officer shall proceed 
to levy any execution on any goods or chattels claimed by any person other 
than the defendant, or should he be requested by the judgment creditor so to 
do, such officer may require the judgment creditor to give an undertaking* 
with good and sufficient sureties, to pay all costs and damages that he may 
252 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 69 
_AIH by reason of the detention or sale of such property; and until such 
^^frtaking is given, the officer may refuse to proceed against such property, 
^ f ^ d e r for appearance of judgment debtor; arrest At any time 
^ i n execution may issue on a judgment, the court from which an execution 
^*ht issue shall, upon written motion of the judgment creditor, with or 
*$hout
 notice as the court may determine, issue an order requiring the judg-irl
^nt debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, to appear before the court 
0 master at a specified time and place to answer concerning his or its 
°rot)erty. A judgment debtor, or if a corporation, any officer thereof, may be 
l a i r e d to attend outside the county in which he resides, but the court may 
jjtafce such order as to mileage and expenses as is just. The order may also 
l e ^ a i n the judgment debtor from disposing of any nonexempt property pend-
w t h e hearing. Upon the hearing such proceedings may be had for the appli-
*~£on of the property of the judgment debtor toward the satisfaction of the 
judgment as on execution against such property. 
1
 In aid of an order requiring the attendance of the judgment debtor, the court 
•nay, upon satisfactory proof by affidavit or otherwise, that there is danger of 
the debtor's absconding, order the sheriff to arrest the debtor and bring him 
before the court, and may order such judgment debtor to enter into an under-
taking with sufficient sureties, that he will attend from time to time before 
the court or master, as may be directed during the pendency of the proceed-
ings and until the final determination thereof, and will not in the meantime 
dispose of any portion of his property not exempt from execution. In default of 
entering into such undertaking, he may be committed to jail. 
(1) Examination of debtor of judgment debtor. At any time when execu-
tion may issue on a judgment, upon proof by affidavit or otherwise to the 
satisfaction of the court that any person or corporation has property of such 
judgment debtor or is indebted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, 
not exempt from execution, the court may order such person or corporation or 
any officer or agent thereof, to appear before the court or a master at a speci-
fied time and place to answer concerning the same. Witness fees and mileage, 
if any, may be awarded by the court. 
(m) Order prohibiting transfer of property. If it appears that a person 
or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor or to be in-
debted to him in an amount exceeding fifty dollars, not exempt from execu-
tion, claims an interest in the property adverse to such judgment debtor or 
denies such indebtedness, the court may order such person or corporation to 
refrain from transferring or otherwise disposing of such interest or debt until 
such time as may reasonably be necessary for the judgment creditor to bring 
an action to determine such interest or claim and prosecute the same to judg-
ment. Such order may be modified or vacated by the court at any time upon 
such terms as may be just. 
(n) Witnesses. Witnesses may be required to appear and testify in any 
proceedings brought under Subdivisions <kj and (1) of this rule in the same 
manner as upon the trial of an issue. 
(o) Order for property to be applied on judgment. The court or master 
may order any property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in 
the hands of such debtor, or any other person, or due to the judgment debtor, 
to be applied towards the satisfaction of the judgment. 
(p) Appointment of receiver. The court may appoint a receiver of the 
property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, and may forbid 
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any transfer or other disposition thereof or interference therewith until it^ 
further order therein provided that before any receiver shall be vested wi% 
the real property of the judgment debtor a certified copy of his appointment 
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which any real: 
estate sought to be affected thereby is situated. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivision (a) of this Entry of a judgment after the death ofVsgi 
rule was originally taken from Rule 69(a), party, Rule 58A(e). 
F.R.C.P. Execution and levy against decedent or per 
Cross-References. — Contempt, Chapter sonal representative prohibited, § 75-3-812/ 
32 of Title 78. Fee, additional filing fee for cases where exe-
Contribution among joint tort-feasors, cution requested, § 21-2-2. 
§§ 78-27-39 to 78-27-43. Process in behalf of and against persons not 
County recorder, Chapter 21 of Title 17. parties, Rule 71A. 
Duty to answer questions, § 78-24-10. 
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Assignee of attorney's lien. 
;*rf£j[gignee of creditor, 
^ ^ a g m e n t debtor, 
r i f l e s of purchaser. 
- • ^ , - g f i r e I»VICM>. 
.I^ JaUure to obtain possession. 
'"'jfodification of judgment. 
5£>bom writ directed. 
ijiidicial sale. 
^^^Constables. 
Coat**** of writ 
^IftoJaguance of first writ as second writ 
A clerk may, under circumstances which 
mandate his issuance of a second writ of execu-
S^^eissue the first writ by acknowledging 
Mg initial signature thereon and using a seal 
irtvidusly stamped, and by so doing, he has 
LjflUed the formalities required by Subdivi-
ftion (W that the writ be issued in the name of 
ike state of Utah, sealed with the court's seal, 
a«d subscribed by the clerk. Heath Tecna Corp. 
^Sound Sys. Intl, 588 P.2d 169 (Utah 1978). 
Contribution and reimbursement 
^^Jo-guarantors of installment debt 
Where plaintiff co-guarantor of installment 
4*bt had paid less than half of the outstanding 
balance due, his action against his co-guaran-
loif for contribution was premature since the 
light to contribution depends upon perfor-
mance by one of more than his proportionate 
£are. Gardner v. Bean, 677 P.2d 1116 (Utah 
1984). 
—Joint owners. 
Under this rule there is no authority for dis-
tinguishing between the rights of redemption 
of t judgment lienholder, whose judgment was 
against only one joint owner, and of a lien-
holder whose lien covers the entire ownership. 
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311 P.2d 791 
(1967). 
1
 Where decedent had actively participated in 
purchase and furnishing of mobile home to be 
Hied for the mutual benefit of himself and 
plaintiff, and he and plaintiff had discussed 
marriage and in fact had resided in the mobile 
borne together, trial court was justified in con-
cluding that the decedent was the joint pur-
chaser of the home, that there was a benefit 
given to him at his request, and that conse-
quently he received consideration for becoming 
• co-obligor on the purchase contract. Winkel 
?. Call, 603 P.2d 808 (Utah 1979). 
Enforcement of judgment 
—Method. 
A levy of execution is ordinarily the only 
proper method to enforce a judgment lien, un-
less the case involves special circumstances, 
such that execution does not lie, in which case 
the procedure for enforcement is an equitable 
action to foreclose the judgment lien. Belnap v. 
Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978). 
—Right of winning party. 
Party in whose favor judgment was rendered 
had a clear right to have it enforced, and if 
anyone attempted to interfere with that right 
it was also the clear duty of the court, in case a 
proper application was made, to enforce the 
judgment. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, 
48 Utah 214, 159 P. 541 (1916); Ketchum Coal 
Co. v. District Court, 48 Utah 342, 159 P. 737, 
4 A.L.R. 619 (1916). 
Issuance of writ 
—Partial assignment of judgment 
Partial assignment of a judgment and the 
execution sale held thereunder were valid 
where the judgment debtor had not paid any 
portion of the sizeable judgment against him 
and had not been subjected to collection efforts 
by the original judgment creditor; any 
amounts recovered by the assignee apparently 
inured to the benefit of the assignor; and there 
was no claim of prejudice to the judgment 
debtor resulting from the partial assignment 
or from the execution sale based on the partial 
assignment. Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 69 (Utah 
1981). 
—Stay. 
Bankruptcy. 
Failure to assert bankruptcy as a defense is 
not fatal to a later successful assertion of a 
discharge that postdates the judgment, so that 
a stay of execution of the judgment is proper 
based upon such discharge. Upton v. Heiselt 
Constr. Co., 3 Utah 2d 170, 280 P.2d 971 
(1955). 
—Timeliness. 
Where the judgment was rendered on Octo-
ber 22, 1971, and the execution sale took place 
on Monday, October 22, 1979, the execution 
sale was timely. Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469 
(Utah 1981). 
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Toffing. 
Part payment or written acknowledgment °* 
a judgment does not toll the eight-year limi**" 
tion period for serving process to enforce a 
judgment by writ- of execution. Yergensen v* 
Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d 696 (196^-
Order for appearance of judgment debt^r* 
—Issues raised. 
Constitutionality. 
Taxpayer who did not appeal a judgm^1* 
against him for underpayment of income ta/ e s 
could not raise the issue of the constitution**" 
ity of the tax in a supplemental proceedin8 
whose purpose was to determine the locat*on 
and amount of taxpayer's property for purp^86 
of satisfying the judgment. State Tax Comm* v-
Wright, 596 P.2d 634 (Utah 1979). 
Proceedings on sale of property. 
—Applicability of rule. 
Partition. 
Sales of property in partition proceedi^8 
should be governed by the statutes govern>nS 
partition, and not by Subdivision (e). Gilli**or 
N . QK&fiMst, SKI ^ SA m W ^ k \ m \ 
—Conduct of sale. 
Separation of parcels. 
Description in deed of land as "Lots 1 an^ * 
of block 28, Plat A Manti City Survey" did ^ot 
serve to separate an otherwise unified pat™ 
into two parcels subject to separate sales un^er 
Subdivision (e)(3). Commercial Bank v-
Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P.2d 343 (19^1}-
Certified copy of a certificate of sale c°n~ 
tained in a supplemental record was suffici^nt» 
on appeal, to support trial court's determi*18" 
tion that a parcel of real estate was sold se?&" 
rately where the record contained conflict*11^ 
evidence on the issue. Bawden & Assocs- v-
Smith, 646 P.2d 711 (Utah 1982). 
Setting aside. 
A sale which has been regularly held ^J" 
fairly conducted should not be set aside mete*v 
because a higher bid is offered later. Comitf^ f" 
cial Bank v. Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P-2d 
343 (1951). 
Time of sale. 
Sheriff conducting foreclosure sale may* *n 
his discretion, set such time for sale as n e 
chooses so long as it is within the limit P1 "^ 
scribed by this section. Commercial Banfc v-
Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P.2d 343 (l&l)' 
—Postponement 
From Saturday or day before holiday* 
When a sale which was to be held on a Satur" 
day or the day before a holiday is postponed *°r 
one day, such that additional notice is not J,ec" 
essary under Subdivision (e)(2), the postp0ne" 
merit is, pursuarit \ol lule ^ei), urith the next 
business day. Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52: -
337 P.2d 429 (1959). 
Redemption. 
—Amount to be paid. 
Payment into court. 
The intent of Subdivision (f)(3) is to allow as 
redemptioner to pay the funds into court a<$~ 
that the holder of the certificate of sale cannot. 
clog the equity of redemption by refusing to: 
cooperate in the redemption process. Granada, 
Inc. v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254 (Utah 1986% 
—Construction of rule. .,, ^ 
Foreclosure is in the nature of a forfeiture*-
which the law does not favor, and therefore 
rules and statutes dealing with redemption an^ 
remedial in character and should be given a 
liberal construction. United States v. Loosley. 
551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). * 
—Effect. 
Restoration of property to same condi-
tion. 
The general effect of a redemption by the 
judgment debtor or "his successor is that it re->I 
stores the property to the same condition as if 
no sale had been attempted. Bennion v. Amoss, 
530 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975). 
Waiver of irregularities. 
By redeeming the property, debtor waived 
and was estopped from asserting any irregular-
ities in the foreclosure sale. Bennion v. Amoss, 
530 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975). 
—How made. 
Defects in tender. 
Where at time of tendered redemption pay-; 
ment by assignee of mortgagee to purchasers"•< 
at sheriffs sale no grounds for rejection were 
made, subsequent claim that assignee's failure 
to include copy of judgment and amount of lien 
with payment was not deemed sufficient rea-
son to reject tender. United States v. Loosley, 
551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). 
Substantial compliance. 
If a debtor, acting in good faith, has substan-
tially complied with the procedural require-
ments of this rule in such a manner that the 
lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely 
sSiwhfch, ana \ s g^htig NfttfaVtifciB eiititan'uv 
the law will not aid in depriving the mortgagor 
of his property for mere falling short of exact 
compliance with technicalities. United States 
v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976). 
—Timeliness. 
Extension of time. 
A court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate 
instances extend the period for redemption 
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«*]«8 on execution. Mollerup v. Storage 
fjf 5& 569 P2d 1122 aJtBh 1977)-
• t t j^at ter of bankruptcy after foreclosure 
< ? L | « does not constitute grounds for ex-
^?fltar the time of redemption from sales on 
* * ? 3 L Mollerup v. Storage Sys. Int'l, 569 
! * ? j l 2 2 (Utah 1977). 
jfasJ adjudication of rights. 
here assignee of mortgagor who purchased 
*LLf to institution of foreclosure was not made 
l*l]Ly to the foreclosure proceedings and his 
JiKg were not finally adjudicated until sev-
2^Bionths after foreclosure, he had six 
?«ith» after such adjudication in which to re-
f?rtCarlquist v. Coltharp, 67 Utah 514, 248 
J43I , 47 A.L.R. 765 (1926). 
^ffho may redeem. 
-^^g ignee of attorney's lien. 
tjgignee of recorded attorney's lien has 
ytfllt to redeem property subject to that lien 
S{tt the purchaser at sheriffs sale following 
flujrtgage foreclosure of the property. Downey 
Sgte Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 
j«6 (Utah 1978). 
._—Assignee of creditor. 
Where a grantee of the mortgagor took the 
gpjgnment of a sheriffs sale certificate from a 
judgment creditor in a foreclosure suit, instead 
Jftaking a certificate of redemption, the as-
signed interest was subject to the redemption 
right* of the assignee of a creditor having a 
judgment lien subsequent to the foreclosure 
^ T a n n e r v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P2d 
882, modified on another point, 6 Utah 2d 268, 
111 P.2d 791 (1957). 
*> 
•-—Judgment debtor. 
A judgment debtor can redeem from a judg-
ment sale although he has parted with title 
prior to the sale. Clawson v. Moesser, 535 P.2d 
77 (Utah 1975). 
Remedies of purchaser. 
—Dispossession. 
Scire facias. 
Intent and purpose of statute on remedies of 
dispossessed purchaser was to afford the relief 
provided for by the common-law writ of scire 
facias pertaining to the revival of judgments. 
Continental Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. John H. 
Seely & Sons Co., 94 Utah 357, 77 P.2d 355, 
115 A.L.R. 543 (1938). 
—Failure to obtain possession. 
Modification of judgment. 
Subdivision (g)(2) was not applicable where 
plaintiff obtained the property but wanted a 
modification of the judgment. Pitts v. 
McLachlan, 567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977). 
To whom writ directed. 
—Judicial sale. 
Constables. 
Rule 4(m) merely provides that a constable is 
authorized to serve notice of an execution on a 
judgment and does not constitute authority for 
a constable to conduct judicial sales, which au-
thority, pursuant to Subdivision (b) of this 
rule, is specifically given to sheriffs. Larsen v. 
Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 564 P.2d 1128 (Utah 
1977). 
Cited in Utah Poultry & Farmers Coop. v. 
Bonie, 13 Utah 2d 13, 367 P.2d 860 (1962); 
First of Denver Mtg. Investors v. C.N. Zundel 
& Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979). 
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Rule 70, Judgment for specific acts; vesting title. 
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver 
deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party 
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be 
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by 
the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party. On 
application of the party entitled to performance and upon order of the court, 
the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the prop* 
erty of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court 
may also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal 
property is within the state, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof 
may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it in others 
and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. 
When any order or judgment is for the delivery of possession, the party in 
whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon 
application to the clerk. 
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